









Kenya National Emergency Response Plan

July 2020









Emergency response planning provides strategies for disaster management with a focus on effective preparedness for responses to emergencies. In the past, Kenya has experienced many emergency events that have led to the loss of lives, displacement of people and property destruction. This National Emergency Response Plan (NERP) (the Plan) builds on experience gained from emergencies occurring since the 2009 Plan was issued with new initiatives aligned with international advancements in emergency preparedness and response. It sets out standardised functions of various actors on how to handle the hazards and disasters. It is linked to and anchored on the national plans, strategies, processes, and systems. Planning, both at national and county levels are thus critical to save lives, protect livelihoods and strengthen recovery from disasters and emergencies.

Response planning eliminates conflicts amongst emergency responders and creates clear leadership of command, control, and coordination when a disaster strikes. It entails reviewing response procedures and working out where the gaps are so that responders can be ready when they are needed most. Mitigating the effect of the most recent emergencies has presented the Government of Kenya (GoK) with an opportunity to relook at its levels of preparedness to handle future calamities.

This National Emergency Response Plan will ensure that the country is well prepared to respond to emergencies/disasters. The structures, systems and principles established at the national level through the NERP will be replicated in all areas of the country through corresponding County Emergency Operation Plans (CEOPs) and domesticated based on unique scenarios to foster the restoration of communities and the functioning of society once the disastrous events are experienced and it has been reviewed to be in line with the current governance structure of two levels of government to have a unified approach to emergency/disaster management.

This Plan will ensure that Kenyan lives are safeguarded, properties secured, and the environment is protected.



PREFACE

Experience from history has demonstrated the value of emergency response planning to meet the exigencies of disasters. Although no abstract plans are ever likely to match specific circumstances that suddenly confront disaster managers, such plans provide a vital starting point. Without them, panic and paralysis may set in, if disaster strikes. In such a situation, the first stage in the management of a disaster - that of giving outline direction and guidance within a tight timeframe - can easily be slowed down. Meanwhile, the crisis escalates and may become increasingly difficult and expensive, in terms of lives and money, to resolve.

The Kenyan government has in place the National Disaster Response Plan (2009) and the National Disaster Risk Management Policy (2017). However, because of several changes occasioned by, amongst others, the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, there was a need to review and update the existing Plan to be in tandem with the present governance and operational reality in the country.

This National Emergency Response Plan establishes a process and structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of emergency response in Kenya, from routine localised emergencies to national disasters declared by the President of the Republic of Kenya.

This Plan gives appropriate guidelines for coordination and response to all types of emergencies. It is expected that counties will use the Plan to develop and implement their own County Emergency Operation Plans (CEOPs), any supporting local response plans (e.g. site-specific response plans for airports, chemical sites, etc.) and to train the relevant personnel.

A highly participatory process was employed in updating this National Emergency Response Plan (NERP) 2020 for Kenya. The process was led by the National Disaster Operation Centre (NDOC), together with key stakeholders engaged in emergency preparedness and response, specifically the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU), Disaster Response Unit (DRU), Council of Governors, Kenya Red Cross Society and Saint John Ambulance Kenya.

Key stakeholders that were consulted and contributed to the NERP include:

- → Aga Khan Hospital
- → Climate Prediction and Application Centre
- → Isiolo County
- → Kakamega County
- → Kenya Airports Authority
- → Kenya Forest Services
- → Kenya Meteorological Department
- → Kenyatta National Hospital
- → Kenya Private Sector Alliance
- → Kenyatta University
- → Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS)
- → Kilifi County
- → Kisii County
- → Kisumu County
- → Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries
- → Ministry of Education
- → Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Climate Change Department)
- → Ministry of Health
- → Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning
- → Ministry of Water
- → Mount Kenya University
- → Murang'a County
- → Nairobi County
- → National Council for Persons with Disabilities
- → National Treasury
- → Rescue 24/7
- → State Department of Public Works
- → Tana River County
- → Turkana County
- → UNICEF
- → United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
- → United Nations Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)
- → UN-WOMEN
- → Wajir County
- → Water Resources Authority
- → World Food Programme
- → World Vision

We thank for their support the Nippon Koei consultants and the World Bank team, and all stakeholders who have invested their time and resources to participate in the various consultation workshops and other activities from March 2020 to July 2020, including the process for revisiting and enhancing early drafts of the National Emergency Response Plan.

A deep appreciation is also extended to the Africa, Pacific, Caribbean (ACP)-European Union (EU) Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program, managed by the World Bank through the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) for its generous financial support to the continuing endeavours of the national and county governments to build their resiliencies to disasters through the Strengthening the Government of Kenya's (GoK) Institutional, Planning and Policy Frameworks to Manage Climate and Disaster Risk technical assistance. We also thank Col (ret) Owino, Director of the National Disaster Operation Centre and his team for their input and contribution to the NERP. We would also like to thank the team from Nippon Koei, led by Azim Manji and Paul Hayden, with expert assistance and support from Clement Ngida, Edward Gichuki, Bernice Njoroge and Marko Lesukat. Detailed review and comments were provided by the World Bank Team comprised of Eric Dickson (Senior Urban Development and Disaster Risk Management Specialist), Claudia Lorena Trejos (Senior Disaster Risk Management Consultant), and Judy Waturi (Disaster Risk Management Consultant).

It is our expectation that this National Emergency Response Plan will be utilised by all stakeholders for the continued improvement of emergency preparedness and response in Kenya.

This Plan is a living document and shall be reviewed on a biennial (two-yearly) basis as a minimum to incorporate lessons learnt and good practices identified. Simulation exercises shall be conducted at the national, county and sectoral levels, to test the effectiveness and efficiency of the Plan with minimum frequencies as set out in **Chapter 4.2.**

It should be noted that at the time of preparing the NERP, a draft Disaster Risk Management Bill (2020) was under consideration. Where possible, the NERP has adopted proposed terminology and structures from the draft Bill. However, to enable the NERP to be adopted and an implementation programme structured without delay, some references to existing structures and organisations are also included. Responsibility for the dissemination of the Plan and management of implementation and administrative tasks has been given to the National Disaster Operation Centre (NDOC). This arrangement shall be reviewed once new national legislation has been adopted.

To reduce the impact on the NERP of future legislative change or structural changes to key ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), the NERP introduces a functional approach to emergency management. The preparedness and Unified Command structures set out in the NERP are designed for easy amendment in the future to reflect any changes in MDA structure or terminology without impacting the overall response principles and coordination structures established.

As the NERP has been introduced in anticipation of a new Disaster Risk Management Act, it should be reviewed and revised once that Act is in place to ensure that terminology and MDA structures remain consistent with the final legislation adopted. In the interim period, the structures proposed in the NERP are consistent with existing constitutional, legal and governance arrangements, and can be activated and put together in the event of an emergency to coordinate and manage the response.

Sincerely,

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Note: The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the author. The European Union is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.

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This National Emergency Response Plan (NERP or the Plan) will be shared with all ministries, departments and agencies as listed in the Presidential Executive Order No.1 of 2018 – Reorganisation of the Government of Kenya.

The NERP will also be shared with national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), development partners, private sector bodies and all other relevant stakeholders.

The availability and distribution of this Plan is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government as well as the National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC) whose contact address is:

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASAL Arid and Semi-Arid Land

BBB Build Back Better

CBD Central Business District
CCO County Coordination Office

CDRMC County Disaster Risk Management Committee

CEOP County Emergency Operation Plan

CS Cabinet Secretary

DRM Disaster Risk Management
DRU Disaster Response Unit
EOC Emergency Operation Centre

EPR Emergency Preparedness and Response

ERP Emergency Response Plan GoK Government of Kenya

HAP Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
I/NGO International Non-Governmental Organization

ICS Incident Command System

IAP Incident Action Plan

KFSSG Kenya Food Security Steering Group KNBS Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

KRCS Kenya Red Cross Society
KWS Kenya Wildlife Services

LGD Lead Government Departments
MAC Multi-Agency Coordination
MDA Ministry, Department or Agency
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MolCNG Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government

NDMU National Disaster Management Unit NDOC National Disaster Operations Centre

NDRMA National Disaster Risk Management Authority.

NDRMC National Disaster Risk Management Committee

NDRP National Disaster Response Plan
NERP National Emergency Response Plan
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NIMES National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System

NSC National Security Council

PDNA Post Disaster Needs Assessment

PS Principal Secretary

SCDRMC Sub-County Disaster Risk Management Committee

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

UC Unified Command



This National Emergency Response Plan (NERP) provides the framework and structures necessary to ensure clear leadership and effective command, control and coordination for any disaster event impacting Kenya. It aligns response and early recovery arrangements in Kenya with international best practices and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, especially Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk; Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; and, Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to 'Build Back Better' in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction to ensure focused action in incident management.

The NERP is not a standalone document and it recognises the vital importance of other sectoral and contingency plans. The NERP should therefore be considered as the umbrella document, providing the national framework for emergency preparedness and response beneath which more detailed and sector-specific emergency response plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) may be produced by individual ministries, departments, and agencies.

Overall, the Plan is anchored in the Kenya Vision 2030 where it promotes safety, security and protecting Kenyan assets from adverse impacts of hazards and disasters.

The Plan is also aligned to the strategic objectives of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (MolCNG) and protects the social, economic and political pillars of the country. The emergency incident command system (ICS) and structures referred to in this document will provide a strategic, operational and tactical guide for response lead agencies, NGOs and private sector partners during emergency incidents in the country.

This NERP has been revised by the MolCNG through the NDOC in consultation with government ministries, supported by a World Bank's technical assistance funded by the Africa Caribbean Pacific – European Union Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Programme and with inputs from other stakeholders.

The approval of this NERP as a national working document authorises the NDOC to implement strategies and activities therein with other government agencies while collaborating with other stakeholders in disaster response incidents.





BACKGROUND

Like many other countries, Kenya has experienced an increase in the frequency of disasters over the past two decades. Many of these disasters are driven by climatic change occurrences and natural hazards such as droughts, floods, landslides, and epidemic outbreaks. Coupled with man-made disasters, they destroy infrastructure, divert planned use of resources, and interrupt social systems and economic activities. These disasters are a key impediment to sustainable development.

Effective emergency preparedness and response has at its core several fundamental goals:

- → Protect human life and, as far as possible, wildlife, property, and the environment;
- → Alleviate suffering;
- → Support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
- → Uphold the rule of law, the Constitution, and the democratic process.

The 2009 National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) guides emergency preparedness and response at all levels. This 2020 revision to the NDRP, now entitled the National Emergency Response Plan (NERP) (the Plan) includes updates to reflect advances in emergency preparedness and response practice and incorporates new structures and ways of working to reflect devolution of responsibilities to the county level. The Plan also seeks to advance activities that assist in the delivery of priorities set out in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, particularly Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk; Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; and Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to 'Build Back Better' in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. These are discussed further in this introductory chapter.

The NDRP sets out the multi-agency and multi-sectoral arrangements in Kenya for emergency preparedness and response (EPR), allowing communities and responders to effectively prepare for, and respond to, any disasters occurring. The responsibility for the implementation of the Plan is that of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government.



1 2 AIM OF THE NERP

The National Emergency Response Plan (NERP) provides guidance and establishes the framework required to ensure that preparedness for disaster response, response management, and early recovery are undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative manner, ensuring the greatest protection of life, property, health and environment; and minimising human suffering and trauma during disasters and emergencies.

OBJECTIVES OF THE NERP

The objectives of the NERP are as follows:

- a. Establishes a comprehensive multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional and all-hazards framework for the effective management of emergency response in Kenya, recognising the contribution of all responders, including communities themselves. This includes associated preparedness activities essential to enable an effective response to be made, such as the preparation of plans, undertaking of training and conduct of drills and simulations.
- **b.** Establishes a resilient system of coordination and incident command that can harness the contributions of government agencies, civil society, private sector and communities that can be applied at the national, county and sub-county levels.
- **c.** Defines key roles and responsibilities for emergency management functions, establishing the conditions under which responders from different levels of government and private or external partners are mobilised, and providing a description of the

- organisational concepts and structures used to coordinate the actions of response stakeholders working at the national, county and sub-county levels.
- **d.** Provides a set of concepts and principles that can be applied in preparing to respond to any hazard and at any level, supported by common operating protocols, operational priorities, and general strategies for ensuring interoperability and effective information management.
- **e.** Establishes standardised resource management procedures that enhance efficiencies in coordination amongst different jurisdictions or organisations.
- **f.** Ensures a scalable approach, such that it may be used for all emergency incidents (from routine small-scale emergencies to larger-scale national disaster events); and
- **g.** Ensures a dynamic system that promotes the coordination of different institutional, sectoral and community response partners, and the maintenance of effective plans.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE NERP

The 2017 National Disaster Risk Management Policy establishes several important principles that must guide all emergency preparedness and response activities in Kenya. These principles have been contextualised as noted below and adopted for the NERP where relevant such that:

- a. This NERP will be guided by the Constitution of Kenya.
- b. This NERP will also be guided by humanitarian principles and the Kenya Bill of Rights.
- **c.** The NERP will support a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral approach. Disasters cut across disciplines and sectors; therefore, the government will promote the adoption of an inclusive multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral approach.
- d. The NERP recognises that disaster risk management is a sustainable development is sue which requires a coordinated and collaborative approach in addressing social, economic, and environmental goals, and fundamentally involves supporting communities in understanding and managing the hazards and disasters affecting them.
- e. The NERP puts in place a strong governance framework with clear policies to support the requirements of legislation and accountability and recognising institutional and organisational arrangements and connections across and within levels of government, sectors, and communities.

- **f.** The NERP applies to responses to all hazards and includes actions for emergency preparedness, ensuring that responders and communities have made appropriate plans and undertaken training drills and exercises to test them.
- g. The NERP should be taken into consideration during national planning and budgetary processes and included in county plans and community development plans. This is essential in enhancing sustainable and inclusive national development.
- **h.** The NERP recognises the need to conduct a risk assessment for specific hazards to inform on decisions relating to the prevention, mitigation, response and recovery, and adoption of regulatory and incentive-based disaster risk management instruments.
- **i.** The NERP and associated incident command system (ICS) promotes and creates, public, private and community partnerships for disaster risk management.
- **j.** The NERP recognises gender-mainstreaming as a core factor in disaster risk management.


J SCOPE OF THE NERP

-1.5.1 PHASES OF DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

International developments in emergency management define four phases of disaster risk management, each of which must be integrated. These four phases are set out in **Figure 1**: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The NERP addresses the response phase of an emergency, setting out the structures for effective coordination of the emergency response. To ensure an effective response, the NERP is linked to other phases of emergency management, such as preparedness for response and early recovery actions undertaken alongside emergency response. The NERP does not cover longer-term mitigation challenges, such as climate change adaption or investment programmes. However, effective emergency preparedness and response can help to ensure that mitigation actions and investments can be protected from emergencies arising. The NERP is an all-hazard plan, establishing generic response structures and an incident command system that can be applied by all responding ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) along with responders from non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) and the private sector. The NERP can also be applied to any emergency type regardless of scale or causation. The relationship of the emergency response and other phases of emergency management is set out below.

FIGURE 1: Phases of Emergency Management



SOURCE: Adapted from Kampala Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Framework 2019, World Bank

The phases of emergency management are further detailed below:

I. MITIGATION: Preventing future emergencies or minimising their effects.

Mitigation includes any activities and investments that prevent an emergency, reduce the chance of an emergency happening, or reduce the damaging effects of unavoidable emergencies. Mitigation activities can take place before and after emergencies. The NERP does not contain any elements directly related to risk mitigation. Additional mitigation activities such as climate change adaptation measures are out of the scope of the NERP and should be set out in separate plans.

2. PREPAREDNESS: Preparing to handle an emergency

The NERP includes direction on aspects of preparedness directly associated with an effective emergency response with details set out in **Chapter 4.** Examples of such preparedness activities include the production of risk and vulnerability assessments and the development of response plans and other preparations to effectively respond to those risks identified. Multi-agency emergency response plans and more detailed sectoral response plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) need to be prepared and supported in the preparedness phase by training exercises and drills to test response capabilities across all responders. Structural mitigation investments, such as climate change adaptions to city planning or hazard monitoring and early warning systems, can make a significant contribution to effective emergency response. However, whilst these mitigation issues must be harmonised with emergency response planning, they are also out of scope for the NERP and should be set out in separate plans.

3. RESPONSE: Responding safely to an emergency

This includes actions taken to save lives and prevent further property or environmental damage in an emergency, and to ensure a swift return to normality for impacted communities. Response entails putting preparedness plans into action. Response activities take place during an emergency and this is the primary focus of the NERP.

4. RECOVERY: Recovering from an emergency

The recovery phase includes actions taken to return to normality following an emergency, and follow the imperative to 'build back better'. Initial recovery actions may commence whilst the response phase of an emergency is ongoing, for example, emergency actions to produce a temporary repair to critical infrastructure may commence alongside the emergency response and be completed in a matter of hours or days. Other actions to secure the longer-term rebuilding, restoration and rehabilitation of the community could take many months or years to complete and will continue long after the emergency response phase is concluded, and emergency response structures stood down.

The general test used for the design of the NERP is that recovery activities taking place alongside emergency response should be managed through the ICS and unified command structures set out in the NERP. Once the emergency response phase is concluded and emergency response structures, such as Unified Command Committees and Disaster Risk Management Committees, have been closed down, responsibility for management and oversight of recovery activities can then pass to relevant national or local government agencies to be managed in accordance with their sectoral recovery plans.

1.5.2 AREAS COVERED BY THE NERP

The scope of the NERP, as a national strategic document, is to set out in the overarching framework and operational structures for an effective response that can be applied to both large scale disasters and everyday emergencies in Kenya. The National DRM Policy 2017 defines response as "The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the affected people."

The NERP provides coordination and management structures for a response, and guidance of key response functions, describing the generic actions to be taken by ministries, departments and agencies acting as lead or supporting responder in one of six general areas:

- a. Rescue and Environment
- **b.** Security
- c. Health
- d. Humanitarian Services
- e. Essential Infrastructure and Services
- f. Emergency Management

The NERP is the umbrella document which establishes the framework and scope for more detailed and sector-specific plans and SOPs to be produced by individual MDAs. Given that not all emergencies can be accurately predicted beforehand and events may occur for which there is no hazard or sector-specific plan, the general response structures and ICS set out in the NERP provide the basis for an effective and structured response to any harmful or disruptive event that impacts Kenya.

Although the distinction between national, county and sectoral plans, and between these plans and procedures is fluid, the basic criteria proposed for the NERP as a strategic national plan, is to set out essential 'need to know' and general information applicable to all stakeholders in respect of emergency preparedness and response. These will include key response frameworks, structures and ways of working and establishing these as a matter of public record. However, it would be impossible to have a single plan that set out the detailed responses to every conceivable event, or that covered every policy, tactical and technical response detail, down to selection and use of response equipment.

In addition to this National Plan, MDAs with responsibilities for specific hazards or response functions must produce their supporting contingency plans that contain the detailed organisational information necessary to guide their response to events and delivery of response functions for which they are responsible, such as firefighting, health, flood, water and sanitation, or drought emergencies. These more detailed and sector-specific plans should provide guidance and instructions particular to the role, responsibilities, and requirements of that MDA. For example, sector-specific response plans should set out the range of particular functions the MDA is responsible for, and the actions that must be taken to deliver those functions. A general guide to production of Sectoral Response Plans and supporting Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) is set out in **Annex 7**.

Site-specific contingency plans may also be required for special risk sites, for example, chemical plants, airports, or sea/naval port operational plans. These will contain specific risk assessments and information, response instructions, checklists and other details that are only applicable for that specific location or facility. Plans for specific hazard types, such as health emergencies and pandemics will again contain specific details and response arrangements that are hazard-specific.

Localised plans for each county must be produced following the national guidance note for County Emergency Operation Plans (CEOPs). This ensures a consistency in approach across all jurisdictions and at all levels. The CEOPs identify local risks,

resources, and responders. They set out specific action plans for the county, including requirements for preparedness activities such as training, drills and exercises. The CEOP adds a further level of refinement and detail to the NERP, listing the specific actions concerning highly localised actions, priorities, and considerations.

In addition to response plans, setting out what should be done at the national, county, sectoral, hazard or high-risk location level, more detailed information and tactical step-by-step instructions may also be needed to guide practical operations. This more detailed guidance setting out how key functions and tasks should be carried out ought to be contained in the standard operating procedures (SOPs). Key SOPs applicable to multiple MDAs and relating to the establishment of national response arrangements are set out in the NERP, for example, setting out how responses will be coordinated and managed at the national level. However, most response tasks fall to individual MDAs and the concerned bodies must develop their own detailed and sector-specific SOPs to enable their staff to undertake the roles they have been given.

For example, in response to a very major fire impacting an entire neighbourhood and industrial premises resulting in widespread release of hazardous materials with multiple casualties, the response and management structures described in the National Emergency Response Plan should be followed by all responding agencies at the sub-county, county and national levels. In addition to an on-the-scene command post, a multi-agency unified command post, coordinating and managing all of the agencies involved and concerned, may be established at the county and national levels to orchestrate activities. Such a unified command would allow national-level assistance and actors working in the impacted county to manage evacuations, coordinate shelter of evacuated persons, ensure traffic diversions, establish cordons, and contain any hazardous wastes released by the fire.

Extending the example of the fire, in such circumstances:

- → The National Emergency Response Plan provides the overarching response principles, organisational framework, and ICS, and clarifies lead and supporting MDA roles;
- → County Emergency Operation Plans identify local responders, key stakeholders, resources, and actions at the county level;
- → Site-specific Emergency Plans (such as those for a Chemical plant) set out any specific instructions and checklists relating to responses for that site, such as locations of key control valves or critical (or vulnerable) plant and equipment;
- → Sector-specific emergency response plans developed by individual MDAs, such as fire services, will set out their overall organisational responses to a fire incident; and
- → SOPs developed by each responding agency will direct how specific activities are undertaken by their personnel must be carried out, such as fire services SOPs, describing how personnel should use chemical protection suits.

FIGURE 2: NERP Relationship with Other Supporting Documents

Institutional arrangements for emergency preparedness & response set out in the National Emergency Response Plan (NERP)

Supporting Documents to be produced by Counties and sectoral MDAs

Preparedness and Response (EP&R)

National guidance and framework for Emergency

National County and Sub-County Response Structures Establishes lead and supporting MDAs for key functions

Supporting Annexs: guidance on SOPs and sectoral plans

CEOPs

Sectoral, site and hazard specific response plans

SOPs checklist and equipement inventories specific to each MDA

Plans for delivery of specific response functions

SOURCE: The consultant, 2020



AND POLICY INFORMING THE NERP

The NERP is informed by (and must be interpreted to be consistent with) a wide range of laws, policies, and protocols, both those directly relating to emergency preparedness and response, and from key sectors, such as health, agriculture and others. A list of relevant laws, policies and protocols that must be considered in implementing the NERP are set out in **Annex 4**. When developing supporting sectoral response plans and SOPs, both the NERP and other laws, policies and protocols should be considered. This 2020 revision of the NERP has been directly informed by the following:

THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010

The Kenya Constitution Schedule 4: Part One of the schedule, Section 24 - talks about disaster management at the national government level. While Part Two on County Government in **Section 12** is all about fire-fighting services and disaster management. These two provide insight and direction as well as serve as a framework for this emergency response plan.

THE NATIONAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY, 2017

The National Disaster Risk Management Policy 2017 outlines the need for the establishment, streamlining, and strengthening of DRM institutions, their co-ordination frameworks, the partnerships on which the Policy relies, and associated regulations in Kenya. Disaster Risk Management (DRM), as articulated in this Policy, encompasses a full continuum from prevention, preparedness, relief and rehabilitation, back to mitigation and prevention. This will increase and sustain the resilience of vulnerable communities to hazards. This, therefore, entails a radical shift from short-term relief responses to sustainable development and continual risk reduction and preparedness.

In pursuing the national objective of the implementation of Schedule 4 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya on shared functions, it is expected that all the 47 county governments shall develop their respective and unique DRM Policies and that the national

policy for DRM will serve as a useful reference and guidance. This NERP adopts the same approach, providing guidance and reference for the formulation of CEOPs which is set out in more detail in the Guidance Note for Production of County Emergency Operation Plans.

HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES

A common set of humanitarian principles have been adopted internationally and are used to guide and inform strategies and plans. These are adopted in the NERP to establish common principles that should be applied to all emergency preparedness and response activities. In summary, these principles entail:

- a. Humanity: the concern for human welfare and respect for the individual;
- **b. Impartiality:** providing humanitarian assistance in proportion to need, and giving priority to the most urgent needs, without discrimination (including biases based on gender, age, race, disability, ethnicity, nationality, religious, cultural or organisational affiliation);
- **c. Neutrality:** aiming only to meet human needs and refraining from taking sides in hostilities or giving material or political support to parties in an armed conflict;
- **d. Independence:** acting only under the authority of the organisation's governing body and in line with the organisation's purpose;
- e. Participation and informed consent: listening and responding to feedback from crisis-affected people when planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating programmes, and making sure that crisis-affected people understand and agree with proposed humanitarian actions and are aware of its implications;
- **f. Duty of care:** meeting the recognised minimum standards for the well-being of crisis-affected people and paying proper attention to their safety and the safety of staff;
- **g. Witness:** reporting when the actions of others harm the well-being of people in need of humanitarian assistance or protection;
- **h. Offer redress:** enabling crisis-affected people and staff to raise complaints and responding with appropriate actions;
- **i.Transparency:** being honest and open in communications and sharing relevant information, in an appropriate form, with crisis-affected people and other stakeholders; and
- **j. Complementarity:** working as a responsible member of the aid and development community, coordinating with others to promote accountability to, and coherence for, crisis-affected peoples.

By applying these principles, each organisation involved in EPR becomes accountable for the quality of its work to people it aims to assist, and on whose behalf it is acting. Further guidance on humanitarian principles may be found in the Humanitarian Code of Conduct that was adopted in the 2009 National Disaster Response Plan. This is set out in **Annex 5**.

SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 2015-2030

The NERP assists in the delivery of three of the four key pillars of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 which are elaborated below:

Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk

Policies and practices for disaster risk management should be based on an understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, hazard characteristics and the environment. Such knowledge can be leveraged for pre-disaster risk assessment, for prevention and mitigation and the development and implementation of appropriate preparedness and effective response to disasters.

Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk

Disaster risk governance at the national, regional, and global levels is of great importance for the effective and efficient management of disaster risk. Ensuring clarity in the vision, plans, competencies, guidance, and coordination within and across sectors, as well as participation of relevant stakeholders, are needed. Strengthening disaster risk governance for prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and rehabilitation is also therefore necessary and fosters collaboration and partnership across mechanisms and institutions for the implementation of instruments relevant to disaster risk reduction and sustainable development.

Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to 'Build Back Better' in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction

The steady growth of disaster risk, including the increase of people and assets to exposures, combined with the lessons learned from past disasters, indicates the need to further strengthen disaster preparedness for response, taking action in anticipation of events, integrating disaster risk reduction in response preparedness and ensuring that capacities are in place for effective response and recovery at all levels. Empowering women and persons with disabilities to publicly lead and promote gender-equitable and universally accessible response, recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction approaches are key. Disasters have demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of a disaster, is a critical opportunity to 'Build Back Better', including through integrating disaster risk reduction into development measures, making nations and communities resilient to disasters.

THE HUMANITARIAN CHARTER, 2011

All possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamities and conflicts, and those affected by the disaster have a right to life with dignity and a right to assistance.



7 CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE EP&R

The following statements have been developed to capture the core characteristics of effective preparedness and response in Kenya. It is proposed that they should be applied to the preparations for, response to, and recovery from, any emergency. These are:

<u>PREPAREDNESS</u>: All individuals and organisations that might have to respond to emergencies should be properly prepared, including having clarity of roles and responsibilities, and specific and general plans and SOPs. Individuals and organisations should test their readiness and response capabilities by rehearsing their response arrangements periodically as set out in **Chapter 4** below.

<u>CONTINUITY:</u> The response to emergencies should be grounded within an organisation's existing functions and their familiar ways of working, although inevitably, actions will need to be carried out at greater speed, on a larger scale, and in more testing circumstances during the response to any emergency incident.

<u>SUBSIDIARITY:</u> Decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination at the highest necessary level. Local community actors, supported by sub-county and county level responders should be the key building blocks of response for an emergency of any scale, supported by specialists with additional resources and expertise from the national level as required.

<u>DIRECTION:</u> Clarity of purpose should be delivered through an awareness of the strategic aims and supporting objectives for the response. The operational structures set out within this Plan at the national, county and sub-county/incident ground levels to ensure these will be agreed and understood by all involved in managing the response to an emergency. This will allow for the effective prioritisation and focus for actions necessary for the response.

<u>INTEGRATION:</u> Effective coordination should be exercised between and within organisations and between national, county and sub-county tiers of response. This requires timely access to appropriate guidance, information, and support.

<u>COMMUNICATION</u>: Good two-way communication is critical to an effective response. Reliable information must be passed correctly and without delay between those who need to know, including the public.

<u>COOPERATION:</u> Positive engagement based on mutual trust and understanding will facilitate information sharing and deliver effective solutions to arising issues.

<u>ANTICIPATION</u>: In order to anticipate and manage the consequences of all kinds of emergencies, planners need to identify risks and develop an understanding of both the direct and indirect consequences in advance, where possible.

SEXECUTION OF THE NERP

The Principal Secretary (PS) of MolCNG is authorised to mobilise any portion of this Plan to reduce or respond to and recover from the effects of disasters, emergencies or the imminent threat of a disaster emergency. This Plan shall become automatically operational upon an occurrence of a disaster or major emergency or as the situation, conditions or needs may dictate. In the implementation of this Plan, NDOC shall act as the operational arm/secretariat of MolCNG.

AMENDMENTS TO THE NERP

The National Emergency Response Plan is a living document and it shall be reviewed on a biennial (two-yearly) basis as a minimum, or more frequently if deemed necessary by the Principal Secretary, MolCNG to take account of any significant lessons learned from emergency responses, drills or exercises. The Principal Secretary, MolCNG, may

also set the scope for biennial reviews, examining the entire NERP or separate elements as may be required.

In case any errors have been identified in this Plan or further updates, revisions, errors or omissions should be considered, readers may contact the NDOC at the below address:

The Director, National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC),

Nyayo House, 3rd Floor,

P.O Box 48956 - 00100 Nairobi, Kenya.

Telephone

General: +254 02 2211445, 210053 Operations: +254 02 2212386

Fax: +254 02 2210077, 2250649

eMail: operations @ national disaster.go.ke, national disaster.go.ke

Proposed amendments of a minor nature, e.g. names, telephone numbers, addresses, etc., which, do not affect the procedural matters will be dealt with administratively by the NDOC Director and promulgated as per the distribution list.

A copy of the Plan is available at the NDOC offices and via their website: www.ndoc.co.ke



INTRODUCTION

Kenya is situated in East Africa within latitude 5° north to 5° south, longitudes 34° east to 41.24° west. It has a surface area of 582,650 Km2. It is bordered by Ethiopia and South Sudan to the north, Somalia and the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the south and Uganda to the West as shown in Figure 3 below. This section describes some of the key hazards and disaster occurrences in Kenya. Further disaster risk information is set out in Annex 6, including maps of; disaster occurrences, geological features, food security, flood hazard, drought hazard, landslide, and earthquake.

FIGURE 3: Map of Kenya and Neighbouring Countries



SOURCE: The consultant, 2020

Kenya's population is about 47,564,296 based on the 2019 census results, of which, 23,548,056 are males, 24,014,716 are females and 1,524 intersex. In 2018, the rural population was 37,501,479, which accounted for 72.97% of Kenya's population (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics - KNBS). It is noted that roughly 60% of the urban population in Kenya live in an informal settlement (The World Bank, 2018). These rural and urban populations that live in informal settlements are the most affected when disaster strikes. At least 36.8% of Kenyans live below the poverty line of USD \$1.90/day (United Nations Development Programme – UNDP, 2019).

In addition, Kenya is vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters and the challenge has been exacerbated by the increasing rates of urbanisation coupled with altered climatic conditions as a result of global climate change phenomena. With global temperatures expected to continue to rise in all seasons, and with models suggesting that warming of about 1°C will occur by 2020, and 4°C by 2100 (UNDP, 2019), Kenya's vulnerability to disaster risk is likely to increase over the coming years. Multiple disaster risk assessments of Kenya conducted by National and International agencies have identified that the country is exposed to the following hazards: drought, famine, food insecurity, floods, epidemics, landslides, sea waves, tsunamis and technological hazards, deforestation, desertification, transport accidents, conflicts, pollution, structural failures, terrorism, fires, invasive species, strong winds, and wildfires.

Over 80% of Kenya's landmass is within arid or semi-arid lands (ASALs) and continues to suffer from recurrent droughts that cause massive food insecurity. Impacts of climate change are also being experienced in the ASAL regions with increased seasonal floods also affecting the region. More than one million people experience constant food insecurity in the ASALs alone. Considering such insecurity also occurs in urban informal settlements (UNDP, 2019) the number is considerably higher. Indeed, complex combinations of socio-economic, political, environmental, cultural and structural factors act and interact to affect vulnerability to hazards or disasters.

O COMMON HAZARDS IN KENYA

Kenya has experienced both human-induced and natural phenomenon with a significant increase in natural hazard-related disasters over the last two decades. The

number of weather-related disasters continues to rise. The greatest number of deaths in these disasters is attributed to droughts/famines and floods. Floods affect more people than any other hazard, though medium and longer-term drought and famine impacts are thought to be significantly under-reported. Road accidents lead the list of human-induced disasters, followed by conflict/insecurity and fires. The 2014 long rains assessment established that about 1.5 million people are facing acute food insecurity conditions, after two successive poor or failed rainy seasons coupled with adverse effects of high food prices and conflict incidences. These populations largely inhabit the north-western and north-eastern pastoral livelihood zones of Kenya (Kenya Food Security Steering Group - KFSSG, 2014).

The National Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy 2017 elaborates that the major hazards in Kenya are hydrometeorological. These are the result of extreme climatic events including floods, landslides, lightning strikes and resulting fires, droughts, thunderstorms, hailstorms, sandstorms and frost. The main hydrometeorological disasters being floods, drought and landslides. The National DRM Policy further explains that geotectonic and geomorphic hazards also affect some parts of Kenya and that these hazards are driven by the earth's internal energy including earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunamis. Earthquakes and tremors in Kenya arise from movement along the geological faults in the East African Rift System. Moreover, the Policy elaborates further on biological hazards and points out that they include epidemic and epizootic diseases, the proliferation of pests and parasites and invasion of areas by insects. Climatic factors and available food sources influence the spread of biological hazards.

On 28th December 2019, Kenya experienced its most serious invasion of desert locusts in more than 70 years. The locust swarms started crossing the border into Kenya from Ethiopia and Somalia, eventually spreading to affect twenty-eight Counties (of a total of 47) (Kenya Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, 2020). One swarm was estimated at around 2,400 Km² – an area almost the size of the city of Moscow – meaning it could contain up to 200 billion locusts, each of which consumes its weight in food every day (UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2019).

In addition to these natural hazards, Kenya faces a range of human-induced hazards. The Kenya National DRM Policy defines technological hazards as those originating from technological and industrial sites, accidents, infrastructure failures and improper waste management. It also elaborates that technological hazardous accidents have taken many forms such as i) explosions and accidental discharges in plants or storage facilities handling toxic and flammable substances; ii) accidents during transportation of hazardous and toxic chemicals; iii) contamination of food or the environment by misuse of chemicals; iv) improper waste management of toxic chemicals; v) technological system failures; vi) failures of plant safety designs; and; ix) arson or sabotage incidents affecting human installations.

DISASTER OCCURRENCE IN KENYA

The main disasters that affect Kenya are floods, droughts, landslides, fires, structural collapse, HIV-AIDS (declared a national disaster), epidemic outbreaks, transport accidents and terrorist attacks. **Table 1** below is a summary of major disasters that have affected Kenya from 1997 to date.

TABLE I Summary of Major Disasters in Kenya (1997 – 2020)

Disaster Type	Location	Impacts (Cumulative) Number of People Affected and Economic Impacts in Selected Years	Number of Deaths
Floods/		2,936,481¹ affected by the El Niño rains throughout the country. 2018	>4182²
	Widespread	Floods of 2018 for Kilifi and Tana River damage and losses estimated at \$64.3 million ² .	
		Floods of 2019 over 160,000 people displaced and at least 31 of the 47 Kenya's counties affected ³ .	120
		Floods of 2020 (at time of this reporting) the following river basins had been affected R. Gucha Migori R. Nyando R. Nzoia R.Tana and 36 out of 47 counties with over 161000 households affected, 807,000	237 4
Landalidas	Viembu.	affected or displaced	
Landslides Mudslides	Kiambu, Murang'a, West Pokot	The 2019 Landslide in West Pokot (72 dead, 12 unaccounted), 1,200 displaced/affected.	72

^{1.} Huho, Julius & Mashara, Janet & Musyimi, Peter. (2016). Profiling disasters in Kenya and their causes. Academic Research International.

^{2.} Flood assessment report Kilifi and Tanariver counties 2018.


^{3.} See: https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/

^{4.} See: https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2020/05/237-dead-800000-displaced-in-kenya-floods/

Disaster Type	Location	Impacts (Cumulative) Number of People Affected and Economic Impacts in Selected Years	Number of Deaths	
	Widespread	1999-2001 (4.4million affected).		
Drought		The drought of 1999-2000 had estimated economic losses estimated at \$2.8 billion. ⁵		
		2004 (4million affected) 70 per cent live- stock loss for pastoralist communities.	40	
		2005 with 2.5 million affected. The drought was declared a national disaster.		
		2008-2011 drought damage and losses estimated at approximately \$12 bil- lion compared to Kenya's GDP of \$71 billion in 2011.6		
		2012 (3.75 million affected).		
		2017 (4 million affected).		
Fire	Sinai Pipeline (2011)	116 hospitalised with serious burns.	100-300	
	Lamu Fire (2009)	430 homes destroyed and 2,500 affected.		
	Sanchang'wan Oil Tanker Fire tragedy (2009)		150	
	Kapokyek Oil Tanker Fire (2009)		45	
Structural collapse	Building Collapse in Huruma, School (Precious Talent) collapse in Ngando; Mukuru Fuata Nyayo South B	210 persons affected.	26	
Road accidents	widespread	Fatality rate of 27.8 per 100,000 populations. ⁷	3,153 in year 2018 ⁷	

- 5. Stockholm Environment Institute (2009). "Economics of Climate Change in Kenya".
- **6.** Republic of Kenya (2012) "Kenya post disaster needs assessment (PDNA): 2008-2011 drought": with technical support from the European Union, United Nations and World Bank.
- **7.** WHO. (2018). Global Status Report on Road Safety. New York: World Health Organisation
- 8. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) (2020) Statistical Abstract 2019, Nairobi Kenya
- **9.** Nderitu, G. (2015). (Rep.). International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). Retrieved June 22, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09428
- **10.** https://nacc.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/KARPR-Report_2018.pdf

Disaster Type	Location	Impacts (Cumulative) Number of People Affected and Economic Impacts in Selected Years	Number of Deaths
Disease outbreaks (2004 - 2015) Meningitis (2006), Measles (2007) Cholera (2007, 2008, 2015)	Widespread	7,857 persons affected by meningitis, Measles, and Cholera.	>483
Terrorism attacks Since 2011,	American Embassy Nairobi (1998)	5,600 injuries.	214
	Paradise Hotel in Mombasa (2002)	80 persons affected.	15
	Al-Shabaab attacks (2012) – 17 attacks across Kenya. ⁹	200 persons affected.	48
	Westgate shopping mall attack (2013)	171 persons affected.	45
	Mpeketoni attacks (2014)		26
	The Garissa University attack (2015)	147 dead plus an addi- tional 79 injured.	3,153 in year 2018 ⁷
	14 Riverside terror attack, Westlands (2019)	28 persons affected.	
Locust Invasion 2020	Meru, Kitui, Machakos, Isiolo, Samburu, Marsabit, Garissa, Baringo, Embu, Tharaka Nithi, Makueni, Laikipia, Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, West Pokot, Trans Nzoia, Bungoma, Nyeri, Kirinyaga, Mandera, Kajiado, Wajir, Kericho, Nyandarua, Uasin Gishu, Kisumu and Kakamega.	Loss of crops and green lands	
COVID 19 Pandemic 2020	Over 40 Counties affected	9448 confirmed cases (as of 10 th July 2020)	181 deaths (as of 10 th July 2020)
HIV-AIDS 1984 –2020	All counties	1,493,400 people living with HIV ¹⁰	28,200 deaths



J. INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS) OVERVIEW

A key component of the NERP is the formalisation of structures necessary for the effective coordination of emergency response at all levels. This is achieved through the introduction of a National Incident Command System (ICS) that establishes the structures, definitions, and ways of working that will be used to guide the emergency response and recovery activities of all responders in Kenya regardless of the emergencies scale or causation.

Most of the serious emergencies that might impact Kenya will require an effective multi-agency and multi-sectoral response. The key objective in adopting a common ICS is to ensure that all responders have clarity and certainty about how responses will be managed and coordinated at the national, county and sub-county levels to enable responders from multiple MDAs, including i/NGOs and the private sector to work together effectively to resolve an emergency.

The Kenya ICS is flexible, enabling the response to any specific emergency to be framed around its nature and scale, recognising the role of lead and supporting MDAs and maintaining the principle of subsidiarity established in the constitution, recognising that emergencies will be managed and resolved at different levels of government. The ICS can be applied by all responding MDAs, i/NGOs and private sector responders, providing a mechanism for them to work together effectively.

J.A KEY PRINCIPLES FOR ICS

The ICS establishes several guiding principles to be applied to emergency response. The following five principles are key:

I. ENGAGED PARTNERSHIP

Leaders at all levels must communicate and actively support engaged partnerships by developing shared goals and aligning capabilities so that no one is overwhelmed in times of crisis. Layered, mutually supporting capabilities at national, county and sub-county levels allow for planning together in times of calm and responding together effectively in times of need. The engaged partnership includes ongoing communication of incident activity among all partners and shared situational awareness for a more rapid response.

II. TIERED RESPONSE

Incidents must be managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities and resources coordinated at a higher level when needed. In determining the appropriate command level for any specific emergency, it is not necessary to wait for each level be overwhelmed prior to the establishment of the next level.

Incidents begin and end locally, and most are wholly managed at the local level. Many incidents require a unified response from local agencies, NGOs, and the private sector, and some require additional support from neighbouring jurisdictions or the county level. A small number require national operational or policy-level support. The Kenya ICS recognises this and is structured to provide additional, tiered levels of support providing more resources or capabilities to support and sustain the response and initial recovery. All levels should be prepared to respond, anticipating the resources and actions that may be required and undertaking training and exercises to ensure that those capabilities can be deployed and managed effectively.

III. SCALABLE, FLEXIBLE, AND ADAPTABLE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

As emergency incidents vary in size, scope, and complexity and may escalate rapidly, response structures must be capable of adapting to meet requirements. The number, type, and sources of resources must be able to expand rapidly to meet needs associated with a given incident.

IV. UNITY OF EFFORT THROUGH A UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

The key objective of an ICS is to ensure that all available resources and responders can be coordinated effectively. This is achieved by unifying the efforts of responders at specific functional levels of command. These 'unified commands' (UCs) are indispensable to response activities, establishing a clear understanding of the command structure and the roles and responsibilities of each participating organisation. Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each participating organisation whilst harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common objectives.

Use of the ICSs is an important element across multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency incident management activities. It provides a structure to enable agencies with different legal, jurisdictional, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively.

V. READINESS TO ACT

An effective response requires the readiness to act balanced with an understanding of risk. From county to national governments, the national response depends on the ability to act. Thinking about future incident management requirements and acting early is imperative for incidents that have the potential to expand rapidly in size, scope, or complexity. For no-notice incidents, it is equally important to think about the future development of the emergency and to put in place emergency response structures to deal with the anticipated challenges and impacts, not just those immediately apparent.

Once response activities have begun, decisive action on the scene is often required of responders to save lives and protect property and the environment. Although some risk may be unavoidable, first responders can effectively anticipate and manage risk through proper training and planning.

J ICS STRUCTURE AND LEVELS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The Kenya Incident Command System provides a robust, all-hazard, multi-agency, and multi-sectoral framework for resolving any emergency regardless of scale or causality. It adopts a tiered disaster response approach, consistent with the Constitution and based on the principle of subsidiarity. It acknowledges that emergency response must be managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities and resources coordinated at a higher level when needed.


In order to align with the Constitutional principle of subsidiarity and the National Disaster Risk Management Policy (2017), the Kenya ICS creates formalised coordination and decision-making Unified Command (UC) Committees at four functional levels, each aligned to an existing level of government decision making. To differentiate between levels or response and functional levels of decision making, each has been given a colour coding as follows;

- a. National Policy Direction Platinum Function
- b. National Operational Strategy Gold Function
- c. County Management of county response Silver Function
- d. Sub-County Management of sub-county response Bronze Function

Management of field operations small scale emergencies is delivered informally by communities or through field ICSs put in place by responder agencies. Where an emergency level has been declared and SCDRMC established, local incident command posts may be established to coordinate on the scene activities as required.

These 4 functional levels (*National/Platinum*; *National/Gold Function*; *County/Silver Function*; *and sub-County/Bronze Function*) of incident command create a 'chain of command' from Sub-County level to the President, with each level having its key responsibilities. An overview of the ICS and associated UC Committees are set out in **Figure 4** below.

FIGURE 4: Simplified ICS Command Hierarchy



SOURCE: The consultant, 2020

Generally, emergencies start at the local level and most are resolved by communities themselves coordinating their actions informally. Communities are assisted in resolving small scale local emergencies by government agencies and other responders that will adopt their own sectoral or field ICS to manage their resources working at the incident scene, village or ward level. If the emergency develops and the impacts become more significant or threaten to become more significant, an emergency level declaration will be required and formalised ICS structures established.

Generally, a formal declaration of an emergency level and activation of unified commands will occur 'bottom-up' with activation of a unified command at sub-county level and escalating to county and national levels as required to meet the needs of the emergency. However, in some instances, such as in response to a slow onset emergency or early warning, emergency levels may be activated at the national level, requiring activation of county and sub-county UCs beneath them to prepare for, and manage the impact of local events. Further guidance on establishing the appropriate emergency level is set out in **Section 3.3.1** below.

Emergency levels and an overview of the role of national and local government are summarised in **Table 2** below:

TABLE 2: Categorisation of Emergency Levels

Emergency Level	Definition of Each Level	Role of National Government	Role of County Government
No formal emergency declaration	Minor, localised, emergency events dealt with by community members or the protective, emergency and health services working within their normal arrangements.	None – general monitoring of the situation only.	None – general monitoring of the situation only.
Level 1	Significant localised emergencies that require, or may require, formalised support and coordination at the sub-county level.	Monitoring of the situation.	The formal declaration of a Level 1 emergency, activation of SCDRMC in the impacted sub-county, CDRMC acti- vated to monitor the situa- tion if required.
Level 2	Emergency events that have, or may; 1. Have significant impact and consequences; or 2. Overwhelm the capacity of the resources in sub- county, but which do not overwhelm the capacity of the county resources to respond and recover.	Monitoring of the situation to determine whether Level 3 declaration is required, advisory role to support CDRMC if it is not.	The formal declaration of a Level 2 emergency, activation of SCDRMC in all impacted sub-counties. Activation of CDRMC to manage the county level response and resources, NDRMC duty officer informed.
Level 3	Emergency events that have or may; 1. Overwhelm the resources available to a county; 2. Have significant and/or national consequences; 3. Requires extensive mobilisation of national resources to respond and recover.	National coordination of emergency response and management of national response assets through the National Disaster Risk Management Committee with policy guidance provided through the NSC.	Activation of SCDRMC in all impacted sub-counties. Activation of CDRMC to manage county-level response and coordinate use of county and national resources working at the county level, liaison with NDRMC
Level 4	Building Collapse in Huruma, School (Precious Talent) collapse in Ngando; Mukuru Fuata Nyayo South B	National coordination of requests for international cooperation and assistance through the National Security Council.	Activation of SCDRMC in all impacted sub-counties. Activation of CDRMC to manage county-level response and coordinate use of the county, national and international resources working at the county level, liaison with NDRMC



3.1 DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE LEVEL

It should be noted that in selecting the most appropriate emergency response level, it is not necessary to wait for each lower-level to be overwhelmed before making a higher-level declaration and establishing the associated higher-level command structure. Although most emergencies start locally and then escalate, requiring higher levels of incident command structure to be established, some incident declarations and their associated command structures may also be put in place to meet the future anticipated needs of an event and ensure that command structures and resources are immediately available when needed. Examples include recognition of a developing 'slow-onset' emergency requiring a national declaration of emergency level, or following an early warning, such as a warning of a significant tsunami event impacting the entire Kenyan coastline.

Taking the example of a tsunami warning, a Level 3 emergency may be declared at the national level in response to an advanced warning. On the declaration of a Level 3 emergency, incident command and associated UC structures at the national level and in all impacted counties and sub-counties will occur simultaneously. Making an emergency declaration at the national level based on early warning allows UCs to be activated some hours before the tsunami impacts the coastline. This enables local warnings to be given and evacuation and other community-level plans to be enacted. It also ensures that UCs and responders are organised and stand ready to immediately manage the impact of the tsunami once it makes landfall.

An important feature of this flexible and integrated national system in Kenya is that the various levels of incident management form a single, robust, chain of command. Hence, once an incident level has been declared, all incident management structures beneath it in the must also be put in place to maintain that chain of command. For example, if a Level 3 emergency is declared and National Disaster Risk Management Committee (NDRMC) is activated, corresponding County Disaster Risk Management Committees (CDRMCs) and sub-county Disaster Risk Management Committees (SCDRMCs) must also be activated in impacted Counties and sub-Counties.

In determining the appropriate level of a specific emergency, and therefore the required level of incident command and management, an evaluation must be made that considers both the scale and consequences (or potential consequences) of the event.

Most emergencies are resolved by communities coordinating informally, or by government agencies and first responders using their own field incident command systems without the need to make a formal emergency declaration or establish unified commands. However, where the emergency requires additional resources or coordination that cannot be managed by communities and local responders working alone, a formal emergency declaration is required. These declarations may be made as follows:

<u>LEVEL I EVENTS</u> are declared by the Chair of the CDRMC in consultation with the senior officer of the responding agency on the ground and the Chair of SCDRMC.

Level 1 events may be triggered in one of two ways;

- a. When the senior responder on the ground believes that local operations require additional or external support and coordination. The senior representative of lead responding agency must liaise with the Chair of the CDRMC or their nominated Duty Officer who may then determine whether to make a formal Level 1 declaration based on the best information available at the time.
- **b.** Where the Chair of the SCDRMC is aware of a significant emergency underway at the sub-county level, they may contact the Chair of the CDRMC or their nominated Duty Officer who may then determine whether to make a formal Level 1 declaration based on the best information available at the time

<u>LEVEL 2 EVENTS</u> will be declared by the Chair of CDRMC. They will activate SCDRMCs in all impacted sub-Counties. Whenever a Level 2 emergency is declared, the Chair of CDRMC must inform the Chair of the NDRMC, or their appointed Duty Officer. When informed about a Level 2 declaration, the Chair of NDRMC must determine whether to monitor the situation or formally declare a Level 3 emergency and activate NDRMC.

<u>LEVEL 3 EVENTS</u> will be declared by the Chair of the NDRMC. Where a Level 3 event has been declared, the Principal Secretary (PS) responsible for Disaster Risk Management will advise and provide all the relevant information to the Cabinet Secretary (CS), the ministry responsible for disaster risk management. The CS will advise the National Security Council (NSC) to advise them of the situation and to request their advice on requirements for activation of NSC to provide policy guidance or consider the declaration of a Level 4 emergency.


<u>LEVEL 4 EVENTS</u> will be declared by His Excellency the President on the advice of members of the National Security Council. They will advise the President whenever circumstances warrant a Level 4 declaration and will make any additional policy recommendations as required.

The system for designation of emergency response levels is designed to offer maximum flexibility by avoiding fixed definitions for incident level and command functions. This enables decision-makers at each level to use professional judgement based on the precise circumstances of each emergency. In accordance with the Kenyan Constitution, these judgements must reflect the aim to resolve incidents at the lowest possible jurisdictional level with additional coordination and resources provided from a higher jurisdictional level when needed.

The Kenya ICS also recognises that some professional judgement is required to evaluate the relationship between the extent of any emergency and its consequences or potential consequences. For example, an event with a relatively low impact may still

warrant national declarations and coordination if that impact was spread across the entire country. Conversely, some events, such as a terrorist attack, may be highly localised but because of the consequences of the attack, national declarations and coordination may be required. The relationship between incident levels and the ICS structures are further set out in **Figure 5** below.





SOURCE: The consultant, 2020

3.3.2 INTERNATIONAL/MUTUAL AID

If a Level 4 emergency is declared by His Excellency, the President on the advice of members of the National Security Council, NDRMC will be tasked with putting in place logistical arrangements to facilitate the receipt and deployment of international assistance as required. Whilst the providers of any incoming mutual/international aid may implement their own ICS to manage and coordinate their resources, their efforts must be coordinated with through the Kenya ICS and coordination structures at national, county, sub-county and on-scene levels.

To achieve this several issues will need to be considered by NDRMC to address potential issues or challenges. This will include, but is not limited to;

- **a.** Systems to identify the most appropriate potential providers of assistance and obtain the necessary permissions to make a diplomatic approach;
- b. Systems to gather and then communicate detailed information on the specific assistance required, conditions on the ground, potential length of deployment and safety / logistical support available for incoming teams;
- c. Assistance with any customs, importation, and other legislative controls at borders;
- d. Clarification around cost, insurance, and liability issues;
- **e.** Arrangements for national certification and credentialing of any incoming professionals, such as doctors or engineers;
- **f.** Identification of local counterparts who can plan for the arrival of incoming teams and who will make all of the necessary logistical arrangements for their effective deployment;
- g. Identification of local counterparts who will be seconded to incoming teams to act as the focal point for liaison between the international team and Kenyan counterparts, provide local intelligence, guidance, and direction, and ensure the team dovetails into Kenyan ICS and the associated communication arrangements; and
- **h.** Any logistical support necessary, including transport, accommodation, fuel, food, and water.

Further practical information on coordination of incoming international emergency teams may be found in the United Nations guidance on On-Site Operations Coordination Centres (OSOCC).

J.4 UNIFIED COMMAND (UC)

3.4.1 UNIFIED COMMAND OVERVIEW

Unified Command may be defined as "a system that allows decision-makers representing different MDAs, jurisdictions, private sector and i/NGOs that share responsibility for the incident response to come together and form a committee to manage the response

from a single emergency operations centre or incident command post, allowing agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, responsibility, or accountability." (US Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005).

In the Kenyan context, formal UC structures are established at each of the four functional levels of emergency response. The NERP details the arrangements for national policy and operational UCs and provides an overview of the structures that must be put in place at county and sub-county levels. Further and more detailed guidance concerning arrangements for UCs at the county and sub-county levels are set out in County Emergency Operation Plans.

Each UC comprises both a UC decision-making committee and a supporting secretariat. That supporting secretariat is formed by a command and general staff undertaking specific support roles as set out at **Section 3.5** below. The UC decision-making Committee will comprise senior representatives from responding ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) along with any other response partners deemed necessary by the Chair to assist with delivery of the Committee's objectives. The Kenya ICS is an 'all-hazards' system, so as each hazard and emergency type will involve different ministries and responder agencies, the makeup of each UC formed to deal with a specific event may also vary depending on the needs of the situation.

UCs at each level have several core committee members required to play an active role in any emergency that arises, and additional invited members appointed for their specialist knowledge and expertise depending on the nature of the emergency and the range of organisations involved. UCs must invite and fully involve representatives from relevant MDAs and other organisations, such as NGOs and the private sector, that bring the sector-specific knowledge, skills and understanding necessary to ensure the emergency can be resolved safely and effectively.

Although they are not be designated as core UC members, in many instances, invited members represent MDAs having statutory responsibility to lead certain elements of the response. The UC structure does not seek to change the statutory role and responsibilities of those lead MDAs, it simply provides a structure within which they can fulfil those responsibilities whilst coordinating their activities with others in accordance with national ICS.

For example, an air accident involving a large passenger aircraft may require the coordination of multiple MDAs on the scene, at the sub-county, county and national level. Each responding MDA will be acting in accordance with its statutory duties and capacities, but their activities are coordinated through the National ICS and UCs. In this example, the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) may not routinely be involved in emergency response, but in this instance, it would be essential that they were invited to join UCs at the relevant level to bring their sector-specific experience and to coordinate their activities for regulation and oversight of aviation safety and security under

the Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act, 2002, and the Civil Aviation Act (Aeronautical Search and Rescue) Regulations, 2018.

Invited members may also play a key role in the delivery of key secretariat and technical functions. For example, during a health emergency, the Ministry of Health may take the lead within the UC and additional health experts may be appointed to lead specialist secretariat functions such as Operations Section, Planning Section et cetera. Similarly, an emergency involving agriculture, crops, livestock, or fisheries might require representation from those MDAs and NGOs involved in that field, supporting ministry experts and the core UC membership, including county government and emergency first responders.

The mixture of core and invited members within UCs ensures that effective multi-agency and multi-sectoral responses can be made to any type of emergency, regardless of the causation or impacts.


Whilst each UC has its specific area of responsibility, they also form a single coordination and decision-making hierarchy or chain of command, from sub-county to national level. To avoid duplication of effort and confusion during a fast-paced emergency response, each UC and decision-maker must report only to the next level in the chain of command, and UC staff report only to one supervisor and receive work assignments and orders from only that one supervisor. This 'unity of command' approach ensures that information is effectively shared through all links in the chain of command, and that for individual staff, there is no confusion about what they are required to do, and from whom they should take instructions/orders. A unified command maintains the unity of command as each UC reports to the next in the chain of command, and staff within each organisation or those working in secretariat roles report to one supervisor and only receive instructions from one supervisor.

During any emergency, members of UC committees and secretariat functions will be under significant pressure and will need to consider a wide range of data and information before coming to command decisions. To reduce the risk of them becoming overwhelmed by the situation, the number of responsibilities and resources being managed by individuals needs to be controlled.

International research into emergency incident command has identified that any single person's span of control during emergency operations should be limited to between three and seven individuals, with five being ideal. In other words, one committee member or staff group manager should have no more than seven people reporting to them at any given time. If more than seven subordinate commanders are being managed, then there is a risk that the decision-maker may become overloaded. To address this, the command structure needs to be expanded by delegating responsibilities (e.g. by a committee delegating responsibilities to the secretariat staff, or secretariat staff defining new sections. For example, an Operations Section Chief may establish subgroups with a section head to lead significant activity areas such as search and rescue, pre-hospital care, environmental protection etc. If fewer than three, then the position's

authority can probably be absorbed by the next highest level in the chain of command. For example, during search and rescue at sea with only a few reporting personnel, an Operations Section Chief may choose not to establish subgroups, but to have staff report directly to them. This is portrayed graphically in **Figure 6**, below.

FIGURE 6: Span of Control



SOURCE: Adapted from FEMA ICS Leadership and Management Guide, 2005

UCs will convene and undertake their duties at a nominated Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs). The EOCs will differ in facilities, complexity and sophistication depending on their location and role. For example, the national EOC will require suitable meeting facilities to accommodate all members of the UC Committee and their supporting secretariat. They will also require resilient communication and information, communications and technology (ICT) facilities to enable them to communicate effectively and manage the national response.

UCs at county and sub-county levels may not have a dedicated and purpose-built EOC facility, but this does not prevent the operation of an effective UC. Each County Emergency Operation Plan (CEOP) must identify a suitable location for the County EOC. In the absence of a dedicated facility, county governments may nominate an existing government building that can be used as an EOC during an emergency. In selecting a building to act as an EOC, consideration should be given to the provision of basic amenities to enable the UC Committee to convene and discuss issues, such as a building with a hall or committee meeting room. The selected building should also be able to provide general office, ICT facilities, telephone, and welfare facilities for the use of the UC Secretariat. Further details concerning the selection and use of County EOC facilities are set out in the Guidance Note for Formulation of a CEOP.

3.4.2 UC EXTERNAL ADVICE AND SUPPORT

Historically, separate committees have been developed to address responses to specific hazards, ranging from national security to health emergencies. Each of these committees might implement slightly different response arrangements and coordination structures. The Kenya ICS and UC system as set out in this NERP replaces the role of these *ad hoc* committees and introduces a single multi-hazard and multi-disciplinary structure for emergency response.

Members of *ad hoc* committees have built up a great deal of experience in their fields, and as many committee members are experts in senior government or organisational positions, they will automatically be appointed as core members of relevant Disaster Risk Management Committees and form part of the UC membership. Even where members of existing hazard-based committees are not automatically appointed as core members of a UC committee, they may be invited to join the Committee as an invited member to assist with elements of emergency preparedness or to assist in the response to specific emergencies.

In addition to formal roles on Disaster Risk Management Committees or invitations to join a UC during an emergency, key individuals representing MDAs, NGOs and private sector agencies may be invited to lead or support key secretariat functions during an emergency, ensuring that their experience may be harnessed within the UC secretariat support staff structure as set out in **Section 3.5** below.

At the national level, the Chair or the NSC or NDRMC may request the assistance of any existing *ad hoc* committee to provide independent technical or policy support and guidance to the UC. Alternatively, they may invite representatives sitting on those committees to join the UC committee or secretariat. Where UCs are supported by additional committees and individuals working outside of the formal UC structure, that supporting role is limited to providing expert advice and assistance for decision-makers within the UC system. Committees or organisations supporting a UC do not become part of the 'chain of command' and must not issue orders or instructions directly to external responders or the public. If a committee or organisation supporting a UC believes that actions are required, that advice should be passed to the UC, and orders and instructions will be issued formally by the UC Chair.

At the national policy level, the Chair of NSC may invite additional members to advise on any matter, including representatives from county government to ensure that county needs and views are considered in response policy matters. Agencies such as NDRMC, CDRMC and SCDRMC have a multi-agency and multi-sectoral coordinating mandate, and representatives of MDAs, government, international agencies, NGOs and private sector operators may be appointed as core members, either to join the UC committee or assist in the provision of secretariat support staff. As every emergency

will involve a different set of hazards, and involve different MDAs and other responders, it is important that in addition to this set of core members, the UC Chair will invite additional members reflecting the needs and nature of the emergency. For example, additional health representatives during a health emergency, wildlife experts if it is an animal health-related emergency, or agencies such as the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority if involved in an air accident. These invited members may be appointed by the Chair for a specified period as may be necessary to assist in the proper discharge of the functions of the UC.

The Constitution indicates that disaster management is a shared function between national and county government. In recognition of this, the Kenya ICS establishes UCs at the county and national levels. Although the ICS does not establish a separate UC at the regional level, Regional Commissioners nevertheless play a key supporting role in emergency response. Their primary role is to assist both the NDRMC and the CDRMCs, ensuring effective coordination between different levels of response and between different jurisdictions. They are also ideally placed to provide any necessary guidance and support to county governments and CDRMCs, ensuring the effective use of resources.

An overview of the ICS structure, including both Unified Commands and some examples of committees and individuals that may provide support to UCs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, is set out overleaf in **Figure 7**.


The list of supporting bodies presented in **Figure 7** is presented as illustrative and indicative. In practice, there are a great number of MDAs, NGOs and private sector bodies that may undertake a leading or supporting role during an emergency depending on the nature of that emergency.

3.4.3 PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF THE UCS AT EACH LEVEL

At each of the four functional command levels, the primary objective for the UC is to ensure effective coordination of all responders, at all levels of government, and from all MDAs, NGOs and the private sector. This coordinated approach ensures that the best use can be made of available information and resources, with all relevant MDAs and responders coming together at the UC Committee to jointly gather and share information, assess the situation and associated risks and then develop a joint Incident Action Plan (IAP) that all responders will then follow. The IAPs are designed to set out the measures and actions required to save lives, safeguard the environment and animals, protect property, and ensure a swift return to normality. Further detail on IAPs is set out in **Section 3.4.4** below.

In addition to these generic responsibilities, each level of command also has a primary functional role in the overall ICS 'chain of command' as follows:

FIGURE 7: Unified Command and Supporting Committee Structure



SOURCE: Adapted from National ICS graphic provided by the National Disaster Operations Centre, Kenya

<u>PLATINUM FUNCTION:</u> The Platinum level UC, established by the NSC, is the highest-level UC in the Kenyan ICS and acts as the senior government level policy-making body, establishing policy guidelines and strategic objectives for an emergency response to which all other UCs and parts of the government will conform. A specific function for the Platinum level of UC is to ensure effective coordination across ministries to guarantee a whole of government response to any major disaster response and to engage with and maximise the contribution of international agencies, NGOs and the private sector. If it is considered that additional legislation, funding, or international assistance may be required, members of the Platinum level UC are also responsible for advising His Excellency the President accordingly.

GOLD FUNCTION: The Gold level of UC, established by the NDRMC, is responsible for the management and coordination of strategic operations at the national level. It allows the strategic level heads of all relevant MDAs, including international agencies, NGOs and private sector heads as appropriate, to blend and create an integrated emergency management team. Members of the NDRMC, supported by its command and general staff along with other strategic advisory committees and entities, will work together to develop a national overview of the operational situation, including an assessment of hazards, risks, options and priorities for response. Based on this information gathering and understanding, the Gold level UC is responsible for producing a National Incident Action Plan that establishes the strategies and operational objectives that will be followed by national responders, and they will be responsible for facilitating, coordinating, and supporting any incoming international assistance. In addition to managing national operations, the Gold level UC will provide clear guidance to county-level responders on what national objectives should be incorporated into their plans. Where Platinum level UC is established, the operational strategies developed by Gold will be designed to deliver the policy outcomes determined by Platinum. The Gold level UC will ensure the effective sharing of information with all MDAs and responders and will coordinate all response activities at the national level to maximise the use of all available resources and enhance the efficiency of the individual response organisations.

SILVER FUNCTION: The Silver level of UC, established in each impacted county by CDRMC, is responsible for management and coordination of the operational response at the county level, including coordination of any national or international teams deployed in the county area. The CDRMC enables all responding MDAs, private sector and NGOs to come together at a County EOC to coordinate their activities and establish a County level Incident Action Plan that will address the strategic objectives set by Gold level in the context of local priorities and circumstances, and any additional local priorities identified. The CDRMCs will monitor and manage the resources available to them at the county level and support and monitor the response at the sub-county level, ensuring effective coordination and use of resources across jurisdictions within the county.

BRONZE FUNCTION: The Bronze level of UC, established in each impacted sub-county by the SCDRMC, is responsible for management and coordination of sub-county resources and community members, and provision of support to communities, government agencies and responders working at the scene of an emergency, or the village or ward level. In doing so, the SCDRMCs will undertake two vital functions. Firstly, they are responsible for liaising with communities and responders in the field to monitor and coordinate tactical operations on the ground. They are also responsible for liaising with the CDRMC to keep them appraised of the situation on the ground, requesting additional resources and assistance where needed, and receiving direction on operational objectives and priorities to be applied at sub-county level. The SCDRMC will formulate a sub-county level Incident Action Plan that

sets out the tactics necessary to achieve the objectives established by the county level UC, and take responsibility for monitoring the delivery of those tactics.

Note: Field Operations do not require the establishment of a formal UC or an EOC and will be managed through the field Incident Command System (ICS) operated by each responding MDA. Where a Level 1 emergency has been declared and an SCDRMC activated, multi-agency responders working in the field may coordinate their activities through an on-scene Incident Command Post where necessary.

Further details for the operation of CDRMCs and SCDRMCs are set out in County Emergency Operation Plans.

The establishment of the ICS system applicable to all responders, with UCs forming a functional chain of command linking emergency response planning and management at national policy, national operations, county and sub-county level delivers the following benefits:

- → A single set of strategic objectives is developed for the entire incident, set by the Chair of the highest-level UC activated for any specific incident. For national events, this will be the President, advised by the NSC in consultation with senior decision-makers from each government and non-government entity involved.
- → A consistent, unified, and collective approach is used to establish policy objectives and then develop plans to achieve them at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. The same robust structures are then used to monitor and manage the delivery of agreed actions.
- → Information flow and coordination are improved among all government and non-government entities responding to the emergency as the chain of command provides clarity and certainty for all responders and maintains the unity of command.
- → The establishment of multi-agency and multi-sectoral UCs ensures that all MDAs, NGOs, and Private Sector operators involved in emergency response can share information, and gain a common understanding of the operational picture, enabling them to agree on joint priorities and identify any restrictions limiting response options. All involved responders will not only gain clarity about what their partners plan to do but what they do not plan to do.
- → UCs provides a collaborative forum that ensures that no MDA or sectors legal authorities or responsibilities will be compromised or neglected.
- → Allows for collective approval of operations, logistics, planning, and finance activities.
- → Allows for shared EOC facilities and makes the best use of specialist command and general staff, supporting committees and expert groups.
- → A single all-hazard, multi-agency and multi-sectoral approach to ICS enhances resilience at all levels, reduces training and response costs, maximises efficiency, and minimises communication breakdowns



3.4.4 UC INCIDENT ACTION PLANS

The IAPs will be produced by each UC to guide and direct their response to any emergency. The IAPs will be compiled by the Operations Section Chief, supported by other members of the general and command staff supporting the UC. The Operations Section Chief will present draft IAPs to the UC Committee for their approval. The UC Committee Chair will ensure that IAPs are discussed, considered, and agreed by committee members. The UC does not issue orders or instructions to individually respond to MDAs, NGOs, or the private sector. Once a common IAP has been agreed, senior representatives of response agencies represented at the UC will then pass instructions consistent to the agreed IAP to their organisations and monitor their implementation. In developing IAPs, UCs will have to address three primary considerations:

<u>SITUATION:</u> what is happening, what are the impacts, what are the risks, what might happen and what is being done about it? Situational awareness is having appropriate knowledge of these factors.

<u>DIRECTION:</u> what end state is desired, what are the aims and objectives of the emergency response and recovery efforts, and what overarching values and priorities will inform and guide this?

<u>ACTION:</u> what needs to be decided, what resources are needed, what needs to be done, and by who, to resolve the situation and achieve the desired end state?

Having considered these issues, IAPs developed for each UC must set out such information as may be required for the effective management of the emergency response, such as;

- a. What are the aims and objectives to be achieved or tactics to be deployed?
- **b. Who** is responsible for key actions ministries, police, fire, ambulance, local government, NGO, or partner organisations?
- c. When timescales, deadlines, and milestones?
- d. Where what locations?
- **e. Why** what is the rationale? Is this consistent with the overall strategic aims and objectives established by a higher-level UC?
- f. How are these tasks going to be achieved?

The structures and complexity of IAPs will differ depending on the level of UC, with those at the level of the national policy requiring significant detail and information, and those used at sub-county levels for management of tactical operations being much shorter and more action orientated. However, regardless of level, all IAPs should address the key questions set out above.

Although all IAPs may contain elements of strategic, operational, or tactical information, those at the national level will be primarily strategic, with the Platinum (National

Policy) level UC setting overall policy objectives for the response. Gold (National Operational) level UC will direct the use of national resources and establish the strategic objectives that will be followed by all county-level UCs and incorporated into their own County IAPs.

IAPs at the county level will primarily be operationally focussed, coordinating the multi-agency response, clearly establishing what should be done at the county level, and by whom. Where the NDRMC has been established in response to a Level 3 or Level 4 event, the County IAPs will incorporate the strategic objectives from the national plan, add any further county objectives, and then set out in the County IAP how those objectives are to be delivered. IAPs at sub-county level will be primarily tactical, providing further details about the resources, actions and tactics required at a local level or on the scene to deliver the operational objectives set out in the County IAP.

Further guidance on the production of IAP, and a generic template to assist UCs, can be found in **Annex 3**, specifically within **Annex 3d.**

J. J. UNIFIED COMMAND SECRETARIAT

The Constitution and membership of Unified Command Committees at National Policy (Platinum) and National Operations (Gold) levels are set out in below at **Annexes 1 and 2** of the NERP. Details for UCs at the county level are set out in the separately bound County Emergency Operation Plans (CEOPs).

Each of these formalised unified commands is supported by a secretariat consisting of two specialist staff groups. These staff groups will be established as required to meet the specific needs of the emergency or disaster:


- **a. A UC Command Staff,** comprising specialists in public information, safety, external relations and legal matters.
- **b. A UC General Staff,** comprising specialists in operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration.

For national-level UCs established to respond to highly complex emergencies, each of these staff groups may comprise several specialist subgroups or committees reporting directly to the Section Chief for that Staff Group. For UCs established at county and sub-county level to manage the operational and tactical response to more simple or straightforward emergencies, general staff group functions may be undertaken by a single member of specialist staff, or by a multiagency team as circumstances and resources dictate.

Some highly specialist command staff functions, such as legal counsel, may be performed by specialist advisors that do not join the UC and sit permanently at the EOC facility during an emergency event. The key priority is that arrangements must be in place to ensure that UC committee members have immediate access to appropriate legal advice if required.

An overview of the UC structure including the UC Committee and supporting secretariat functions is shown below in **Figure 8**.

FIGURE 8: Overview of the Unified Command Committee and Staff Structure



SOURCE: Adapted from FEMA ICS Leadership and Management Guide, 2005

3.5.1 COMMAND STAFF STRUCTURE

The Command Staff are primarily responsible for providing support and information to the UC Committee Members, for providing an authoritative source of public information, and interacting with external bodies that are not represented within the UC structure, such as the media and private businesses. Command Staff will be particularly important in supporting national UCs, although Command Staff functions may also be activated to support the county and sub-county level UC as required. Command Staff report directly to the UC Committee as set out in **Figure 9** overleaf.

3.5.1.1 PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER


The Public Information Officer is responsible for developing and releasing information about the emergency incident to the news media, to incident personnel, and other appropriate agencies and organisations. The Information Officer may have assistants as necessary, and the assistants may also represent different assisting agencies.

The following are the major responsibilities of the Public Information Officer, which should generally apply to any incident: (the list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive):

- **a.** Determine from the UC Committee Chair if there are any limits on information release.
- **b.** Develop material for use in media briefings.
- c. Obtain the UC Committee Chair's approval of media releases.
- d. Inform the media and conduct media briefings.
- e. Arrange for tours and other interviews or briefings that may be required.
- **f.** Obtain media information such as video footage etc. that may be useful to incident planning.
- **g.** Maintain current information summaries and/or displays on the incident and provide information on the status of the incident to assigned personnel.
- h. Maintain a unit log.

FIGURE 9: Overview of the Unified Command, Command Staff Structure

Unified Command EOC Structure



SOURCE: Adapted from FEMA ICS Leadership and Management Guide, 2005

3.5.1.2 | LIAISON OFFICER

National and county level incidents are generally multi-jurisdictional or may have several public and private agencies involved. In addition to government responders, there may be a large number of NGOs, businesses, community, and other groups involved in response and recovery efforts, not all of whom may be represented directly in the UC structure. For example, many smaller and local NGOs or business groups may work together with a single representative at a UC.

The Liaison Officer provides a single point of contact for those assisting or cooperating agencies that do not have their representative at UC. Their key duties are to; (the list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive):

- a. Be a contact point for sectoral or agency representatives.
- **b.** Maintain a list of assisting and cooperating agencies and key agency representatives.
- c. Assist in establishing and coordinating interagency contacts.
- d. Keep agencies supporting the incident aware of the incident status.
- **e.** Monitor incident operations to identify current or potential inter-organisational problems.
- **f.** Participate in planning meetings, providing current resource status, including limitations and capability of assisting agency resources.
- g. Maintain a unit log.

3.5.1.3 | SAFETY OFFICER

The Safety Officer's function is to develop and recommend measures for assuring personnel safety, and to assess and/or anticipate hazardous and unsafe situations. Only one Safety Officer will be assigned to the UC. The Safety Officer may have assistants as necessary, and the assistants may also represent assisting agencies or jurisdictions.

The Safety Officer's responsibilities are to advise decision-makers at the UC Committee on safety matters and include (the list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive):

- a. Participate in planning meetings.
- b. Identify hazardous situations associated with the incident.
- c. Review the Incident Action Plan for safety implications.
- d. Exercise emergency authority to stop and prevent unsafe acts.
- e. Assign assistants as needed.
- f. Maintain a unit log.

3.5.1.4 LEGAL COUNCIL

A legal specialist or legal counsel may be assigned directly to the Command Staff to advise the UC Committee on legal matters, such as emergency proclamations, the legality of evacuation orders, isolation and quarantine, and legal rights and restrictions on media access. In case of any disagreement within the UC Committee to the exercise of legal powers, or relating to authorities delegated to officers of MDAs, the Legal Council may be asked to provide a legal opinion to the UC Committee. The Legal Council may not be required to attend the UC in person for the full duration of any emergency, so long as suitable arrangements are in place for the UC Committee to have immediate access to the definitive legal opinion.

3.5.2 GENERAL STAFF STRUCTURE

The General Staff functions are primarily focussed on the direction and support of emergency response and recovery operations at each UC level. In addition to reporting to Committee Members within their own UC, specialists appointed to the General Staff will liaise with their counterparts at other levels of the UC, improving communications between each level of the UC structure from sub-county to national levels.

General Staff sections may be activated and resourced dependant on the circumstances and specific requirements of the emergency. Depending on the nature and demands of the emergency, and the level of UC within the ICS, several specialist subgroups may be established within each section. For example, during a major fire and rescue operation with multiple casualties, the Operations Section may require specialist individuals or subgroups representing key functions such as firefighting, search and rescue, pre-hospital care, hospital care, the establishment of shelters etc.


General staff members should be identified in relevant national or county plans and should be trained and tested in their role. General Staff Section Chiefs report directly to the UC Committee as set out in **Figure 10**, overleaf.

3.5.2.1 **OPERATIONS**

The Operations Section should be led by a single Operations Section Chief selected to meet the requirements of the emergency. The key function of the Operations Section is to produce an Incident Action Plan (IAP) that will be considered and agreed by the UC Committee. The Operations Section Chief will normally be appointed from the lead government MDA with overall statutory responsibility for that emergency type, or the agency that has the greatest involvement in the incident. For example, if it was primarily a fire emergency, the Operations Section Chief should be a senior representative from the fire and rescue service, a health emergency, the Operations Section Chief should be a health representative.

FIGURE 10: Overview of the Unified Command General Staff Structure

Unified Command EOC Structure



SOURCE: Adapted from FEMA ICS Leadership and Management Guide, 2005

The Operations Section chief responsibilities include (the list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive):

- a. Assist in the development of the operations portion of the Incident Action Plan.
- **b.** Supervise the execution of the Incident Action Plan for operations.
- **c.** Maintain close contact with subordinate positions and provide advice and guidance as necessary.
- d. Evaluate operational resources necessary to deliver the Incident Action Plan.
- e. Maintain a unit log.

Although the Operations Section Chief should be appointed from the lead government MDA, most emergencies will require a multi-agency and multi-sectoral response. The Operations Section can therefore be structured and expanded, as required, to include additional staff, or staff groups representing all the key MDAs, NGOs or private sector organisations involved in the response.

Operations Section sub-groups may be established, as required, for the following response functions as set out in the NERP;

- a. Rescue and Environment
- **b.** Security
- c. Health
- d. Humanitarian Services
- e. Essential Infrastructure Services
- f. Emergency Management

In turn, each of these groups may themselves consist of several sub-sections to advise on specific areas. For example, the Rescue and Environment subgroup may consist of specialists working in sub-sections such as search and rescue, evacuation, and environmental protection. The Health subgroup may consist of subsections dealing with pre-hospital care, hospital care and epidemiological surveillance.

The key point is that the needs of all necessary organisations and disciplines may be addressed in the Operations Section, but only those sections and sub-sections that are required for the specific needs of the emergency need to be formally convened at UC. The Operations Chief will judge each situation and advise the UC Committee Chair on the most appropriate Operations Section structure and staffing. An overview of the Operations Section and the various Sub-Groups that may be established, depending on requirements, as set out below in **Figure 11.**

Operations						
Response Functions (activated as required)	Rescue & Environment	Security	Health	Humanitarian Services	Essential Infrastructure Services	Emergency Management
Determinal.						
Potencial Sub-Sections (activated as required)	SAR Sea	Law & Order	Pre-Hospital Care	Registration	Assessment of Disaster Risk	Planning and Coordination
	040	0 - 1 (1) - 1	Hospital Care	Shelter	Restoration	Damage
	SAR Land	Conflict Resolution	Epidemio- logical	Installation & Management	of Commu- nications	& Needs Assessment
		Internal	Surveillance	Food	Restoration	International
	Firefighting	Security Ops	Enviromental Health	Assistance	of Transport	Cooperation
	Evacuation		Animal Welfare	Protection of Vulnerable Groups	Restoration of Water & Sanitation	Coordination
	Enviromental Protection /		Dead Body Handling		Dootousties	
	Hazardous Materials		Mental Health		Restoration of Energy	

SOURCE: Adapted from FEMA ICS Leadership and Management Guide, 2005

3.5.2.2 | **PLANNING**


The Planning Section collects, evaluates, processes, and disseminates information for use at the incident and to inform decisions made by the UC Committee. The Planning Section can be structured and expanded, as required, to include additional staff, or staff groups representing key MDAs, NGOs or private sector organisations involved in the response. When activated, the section is managed by the Planning Section Chief who is a member of the general staff. An overview of the planning section structure is set out below in **Figure 12**.

The Planning Section chief responsibilities include (the list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive):

- a. Collect and process situation information about the incident.
- b. Contribute toward the Incident Action Plan.
- c. Provide input to the Operations Section Chief in preparing the Incident Action Plan.
- d. Establish information requirements and reporting schedules for subordinate UCs.

- e. Determine the need for any specialised resources in support of the incident.
- **f.** Establish special information or data collection activities as necessary, e.g. weather, environmental, scientific advice, etc.
- g. Assemble information on alternative strategies.
- h. Provide periodic predictions on incident potential.
- i. Report any significant changes in incident status.
- i. Compile and display incident status information.
- k. Commence recovery planning at the earliest possible time.
- I. Maintain a unit log.

FIGURE 12: Overview of the Unified Command Planning Section Structure



SOURCE: Adapted from FEMA ICS Leadership and Management Guide, 2005

3.5.2.3 | LOGISTICS


All incident resource and support needs are evaluated by the Logistics Section. The Logistics Section is managed by the Logistics Section Chief, who may be assisted by other personnel from relevant MDAs as required. An overview of the Logistics Section is set out below in **Figure 13.**

The Logistics Section's chief responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

- a. Manage and coordinate all incident logistics.
- **b.** Provide logistical input to the Operations Section Chief and UC Committee in preparing the Incident Action Plan.

- c. Identify anticipated and known incident service and support requirements.
- d. Request additional resources as needed.
- e. Review and provide input to all incident plans to identify logistical requirements.
- f. Supervise requests for additional resources.

FIGURE 13: Overview of the Unified Command Logistics Section Structure



SOURCE: Adapted from FEMA ICS Leadership and Management Guide, 2005

3.5.2.4 FINANCE/ADMINISTRATION SECTION


The Finance/Administration Section is responsible for managing all financial aspects of an emergency where consideration of, and accountability for, government spending or procurement needs to be managed effectively. This includes the establishment of mutual aid agreements or framework contracts as necessary or arrangements for the provision and sharing of goods and services across jurisdictions. An overview of the Finance/Administration Section is set out overleaf in Figure 14.

The Finance/Administration Section's chief responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

- **a.** Manage all financial aspects of an incident.
- b. Determine the need to set up and operate government procurement framework contracts.
- c. Meet, assist and cooperate with the MDA, NGOs, and private sector representatives as needed.

- **d.** Maintain daily contact with agency(ies) administrative headquarters on finance/administration matters.
- **e.** Ensure that all relevant records are accurately completed and transmitted to home agencies, according to policy.
- **f.** Ensure that all obligation documents initiated at the incident are properly prepared and completed.
- **g.** Brief agency administrative personnel on all incident-related financial issues needing attention or follow-up.

FIGURE 14: Overview of the Unified Command Finance Administration Section



SOURCE: Adapted from FEMA ICS Leadership and Management Guide, 2005




OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF UNIFIED COMMANDS

Unified Command Committees and supporting secretariat structures may take some time to set up and obtain a clear picture of unfolding events. This initial period following an incident occurring may be when the best opportunities exist to take decisive action. Where UCs are activated in response to a no-notice incident, their default strategic objectives are to:

- → Protect human life and, as far as possible, property, animals, and the environment;
- → Alleviate suffering;
- → Support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
- → Uphold the rule of law, the Constitution, and the democratic process

As a first priority, each UC is to formulate an IAP and prioritise key objectives that encompass and provide the focus for all activities of the responding organisations under their direction. As the UC Committee meets and gains a full understanding of the situation, supported by the UC secretariat groups, they should then review and amend the working plans and adjust or extend objectives and priorities, as necessary.

In the event of a major national disaster or protracted emergency, policy direction will be given by His Excellency, the President, through the NSC and a more specific and detailed set of strategic policy objectives than those described above may be set. National operational directions to deliver the strategic policy objectives set by NSC will be established by the NDRMC and set out in their IAP. These national operational objectives will direct the actions of national responders and be communicated to CDRMCs so that they can be incorporated into County IAPs. County IAPs will establish detailed operational plans to address both national objectives and local priorities. The CDRMCs will communicate the County IAP to SCDRMCs, who will determine the local operational tactics required to deliver the County IAP, setting these out in their own Incident Action Plan.



4 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW

For the purpose of the NERP, 'emergency preparedness' means:

- a. State of readiness which enables organs of the national and county governments and other institutions involved in disaster risk management, the private sector, communities and individuals to mobilise, organise and provide relief measures to deal with an impending or current disaster or the effects of a disaster; and
- **b.** The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities, and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or condition improving resilience.

Effective emergency response is only made possible by effective emergency preparedness, and the arrangements for both emergency preparedness and response set out in the NERP are interlinked and must be harmonised.

Although out of scope for this emergency response plan, many risk mitigation investment decisions, such as climate change adaption and development of hazard monitoring and early warning systems, can play a key role in overall disaster risk reduction and management. Risk mitigation initiatives, including long term investment pans, must be set out in relevant national and sectoral plans. However, where there is a crossover between mitigation, preparedness and response, for example in early warning system design, specific actions relating to preparedness and response have been included in the NERP and CEOPs.

4.1.1 PREPAREDNESS PLANNING STRUCTURES

Sectoral ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) that are given responsibilities. Sectoral ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) that are given responsibility for specific hazards, areas of regulation, or emergency response functions, have primary responsibility for preparedness planning concerning those sectoral responsibilities. Examples of 'risk owners' for specific hazards include the National Drought Management Authority that has overall responsibility for leading drought preparedness

activities, and the Ministry of Health, responsible for the overall direction of health preparedness activities. Further examples of lead and supporting agency designations for emergency response functions are set out in **Chapter 5** below. However, whilst most sectors and hazards will have a single nominated lead MDA, they must be assisted in preparedness and response by multiple supporting partners working across jurisdictional boundaries and involving national and county government, NGOs, private sector entities and international organisations.

Therefore, whilst a single lead MDA may have primary responsibility for assessing and managing the risks arising in a specific sector, or from a particular hazard, preparedness activities may involve working in partnership with multiple MDAs, NGOs, the private sector, and communities themselves. This multi-agency and multi-sectoral coordination is undertaken through the same structures responsible for emergency management as set out in **Chapter 3**, with standing disaster risk management committees (DRMCs) coordinating emergency preparedness at one of four levels; National Policy, National Operations, County and Sub-County. Lead MDAs retain their statutory responsibilities and authority when coordinating their preparedness work through DRMCs, but the standing committee structures facilitate effective collaboration, including the sharing of risk information and joint planning and training.

There are multiple benefits in using the same structure for both emergency preparedness and emergency response with standing committees at the same four functional decision-making levels:

- → The functional DRM committee structures and ways of working align to existing government and governance arrangements and ensure that the role and responsibilities of all partners are respected.
- → Hazard and risk information can be shared effectively between partners working together at each level, and between each of the levels within the national system, from the community to national policy. For example, risk assessments compiled at the national level by a lead MDA will be made available to partners and planners working at county and sub-county level, where the information can be contextualised for local circumstances, enhanced through local and more granular risk assessments, and built into local community preparedness and response plans.
- → Partners and stakeholders on each committee build up a good understanding of a partner organisations responsibilities and capabilities through joint risk assessment and planning exercises.
- → Organisations and committee members working together as core or invited members of a DRMC will receive training on their role and will participate in joint training exercises and drills, testing and reviewing the plans they have produced.
- → When an actual emergency occurs and members of the DRMC come together as a UC to manage the emergency response, members will already be familiar with each other and practised in working together, ensuring an effective response to any emergency arising.

Key preparedness responsibilities for each standing committee may be summarised as follows:

NATIONAL POLICY FORMULATION FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

National policy direction for emergency preparedness and response is provided by two key bodies, reflecting the different requirements for policy direction relating to emergency preparedness, and for the management of an emergency response. Matters relating to national preparedness policy are managed by the Intergovernmental Council. During a national emergency, policy direction relating to emergency response and recovery efforts falls to the National Security Council.

The Intergovernmental Council (when established) has overall responsibility for emergency preparedness policy at the national level, and for ensuring that each ministry, department and agency has put in place appropriate policy structures and budget allocations to enable them to deliver their emergency preparedness and response plans. The Council will receive, consider, and make decisions based on the reports relating to disaster risk management, provide policy direction and approve plans on all activities related to disaster risk management, provide oversite of the NDCRM Annual Report, and give approval for an annual programme of national preparedness activities. (A full list of responsibilities the Intergovernmental Council is set out in Annex 1)

NATIONAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Overall responsibility for the national coordination of preparedness, including technical and professional support, rests with the NDRMC. This includes the dissemination of national guidance produced jointly by the committee or a lead MDA, conduct of national readiness assessments for key hazards, and creation of an annual programme of national training, drills, and exercises that will be approved by the Intergovernmental Council. The NDRMC will produce an annual report for submission to the Intergovernmental Council, setting out any lessons learned from national or county exercises and drills, or from emergency responses made in the previous year. The NDRMC will have oversight of annual reports submitted from each County Disaster Risk Management Committee (CDRMC). Good practice examples and lessons learned from CDRMC annual reports will be compiled and circulated nationally by the NDRMC, and where appropriate, proposals for revisions to the NERP included in the NDRMC annual report to the Intergovernmental Council. (A full list of responsibilities for NDRMC, and an overview of its membership and linkages to the National Disaster Risk Management Agency, is set out in Annex 2)

COUNTY OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Overall responsibility for coordination of preparedness and response planning at the county level rests with the CDRMC. The CDRMC will also provide information, guidance, and support to stakeholders at the county level to inform their internal emergency preparedness. The CDRMC's work includes a continuous cycle of readiness assessment to evaluate the key hazards and risks facing the county, and the range of

risk reduction and risk response options and resources available to deal with them. The CDRMC will have oversight of the annual reports submitted from each sub-county Disaster Risk Management Committee (SCDRMC). Good practice examples and lessons learned from the SCDRMC annual reports will be compiled and shared with all SCDRMCs and county-level partners, and where appropriate, proposals for revisions to the CEOPs arising from those lessons learned will be included in the CDRMC annual report that is submitted to the County Assembly, copied to the NDRMC.

SUB-COUNTY OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Overall responsibility for coordination of preparedness and response plans, at the sub-county level, rests with the SCDRMC. The SCDRMC is also responsible for providing information, guidance, and support to stakeholders at sub-county and community level to inform their emergency preparedness activities. This work includes a continuous cycle of readiness assessment to evaluate the key hazards and risks facing the sub-county, and the range of response options available to deal with them. The SCDRMC will identify good practice examples and lessons learned from preparedness activities at the village, ward and community levels, and will include details in the SCDRMC annual report that is submitted to the CDRMC.

4.1.2 IDENTIFYING PREPAREDNESS REQUIREMENTS

Preparedness involves several inextricably linked activities, all of which commence with, and are driven by, an understanding of risk. However, risk assessments initiated without first defining a question and an end-user often become scientific and engineering exercises that upon completion must find a use case. Moreover, a risk assessment that is not properly targeted may not be fit for its intended purpose or may be over-engineered and/or over-resourced. Whilst there are many useful generic risk assessment approaches, there is no single process for risk assessment that can be applied universally to identify preparedness requirements, and multiple methodologies exist, many developed for highly specific purposes.

In determining the most appropriate methodology and approach to use in identifying preparedness requirements, it may be useful to consider the following questions;

- → What is the required scale of the risk assessment national, county, sub-county, or local community?
- → Who is the intended target of the results?
- → If the end-user had the information, how would they use it (or would they even use it at all?)


For this reason, most effective risk assessments start with identification of the relevant decision-makers and an understanding of how they will use the information produced through the risk assessment process as this will drive the selection of the most appropriate method. For example;

- → The National Treasury wanting to ensure effective investment in development.
- → Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Public Works, wanting to ensure that roads are resilient to hazards and climate change.
- → Donors/multi-lateral agencies wanting to invest in sustainable and resilient development.
- → County governments developing new land use/city plans.
- → Disaster managers undertaking contingency planning.
- → Responder agencies determining training and equipment needs for their personnel.
- → Small business owners considering insurance or business expansion.
- → Sub-county governments or NGOs determining the most appropriate community engagement and capacity building approaches to protect vulnerable communities.

International experience suggests that where risk assessments have been commissioned in response to a clear and specific request for information, they have tended to be effective in directing actions and in reducing fiscal or physical risk.

In order to identify emergency preparedness and response requirements, the starting point must be to gain a good appreciation of the hazards and risks for which preparedness plans and response capabilities must be developed. The readiness assessment process as set out in **Figure 15** below may assist in this process, establishing planning assumptions against which EPR plans should be developed, clarifying the necessary response requirements, and evaluating levels of current capability or gaps. Although the level of data and complexity of approach may differ, the same basic process may be followed at any level, for example, in undertaking a readiness assessment at national, county, sub-county, Community, or sectoral/organisational level.

FIGURE 15: Readiness Assessment Components



SOURCE: P. Hayden 2015, National Response Plan, Mauritius

<u>WHAT RISKS DO WE FACE?</u> Identifies and describes the type, scale and nature of the hazards and risks identified (at the national, county, sub-county or sectoral level as appropriate. Initially, these may be prioritised so that those presenting the most significant risk are assessed first.)

WHAT PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD WE MAKE? Identifies a set of 'worst credible threat' descriptors for each key hazard against which EPR plans, capabilities and capacities that can be assessed. (Remember, a single worst threat scenario may be used to test multiple organisations and response function. For example, a county-level flood scenario may provide the basis for the design of community education programmes and identification of shelters and safe evacuation routes. It would also be used to test capabilities and capacities for emergency management, search and rescue, pre-hospital care, evacuation, shelter management etc.)

<u>WHAT ARE OUR RESILIENCE REQUIREMENTS?</u> Considers the plans, policies, capabilities, and capacities that are needed to reduce risks, or to provide coordinated disaster response to those that cannot be completely prevented, in order to minimise impacts, safely resolve the situation and recover as quickly as possible.

<u>WHAT IS THE CURRENT LEVEL OF CAPABILITY/GAPS?</u> Determines the current state of community and responder readiness to reduce risks and to respond to the identified emergency in terms of policies, capabilities, and capacities.

<u>READINESS ASSESSMENT.</u> Entails a gap analysis to identify what new EPR policies, protocols, capabilities, or capacities are required to address identified disasters, and what plans and training should be in place to deliver them and assess their effectiveness.

4.1.3 EVALUATING THE PREPAREDNESS OF RESPONSE ORGANISATIONS

The NERP establishes a comprehensive ICS and structure for the coordination of emergency response in Kenya. However, these systems can only be implemented effectively if all organisations involved in emergency response are adequately prepared to undertake the roles they have been given safely and effectively. Each organisation is responsible for identifying its preparedness requirements and for meeting those requirements through planning and training activities.

Preparedness activities, at the organisational level, start with an internal process to identify the response activities and functions the organisation is responsible for, the hazards and risks associated with those activities, and the actions required to enable the organisation to undertake those functions safely and effectively. Having conducted a readiness assessment as set out in **Section 4.1.2** above, organisations can identify

any gaps and capacity building needs arising. This understanding can be used as a starting point for the production of internal training plans, response plans, and SOPs.

In order to evaluate internal organisational preparedness requirements for emergency response, a capability evaluation following the 'TEPIDOIL' (*Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Doctrine and Concepts, Organisation, Information and Logistics*) model.

Internal Response Capability Assessment - TEPIDOIL

For each functional response task, consider each of the following elements of capability, where:

- <u>I. TRAINING</u> what type and level of training are required to acquire the knowledge, skills and understanding necessary to undertake the function?
- 2. EQUIPMENT what equipment is required to undertake the function?
- 3.PERSONNEL- what, and how many, personnel are required to undertake the function?
- 4. INFRASTRUCTURE what infrastructure is required to undertake the function?
- <u>5. DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS</u> what doctrine and concepts, including response plans, SOPs and an understanding of ICS, are required to undertake the function?
- <u>6. ORGANISATION</u> is the internal organisation of the responder agency suitable to support the delivery of the function?
- <u>7. INFORMATION</u> is there sufficient technical information, including risk assessments, hazard, vulnerability, and community data, to enable to support the delivery of the function?
- <u>8. LOGISTICS</u> does the organisation have sufficient logistical arrangements in place to support the delivery of the function?

Whilst different elements of capability may develop at different speeds, only when all elements listed in the format of TEPIDOIL and addressed accordingly can a capability for response truly be said to exist. For example, even if an MDA has a large number of personnel available and the latest technical rescue equipment, it does not mean that there is a capability in place unless those personnel are trained, working to an agreed SOP and are supported by appropriate logistics and ICS.



4.1.4 TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE

4.1.4.1 COMMUNITIES

Training and risk sensitisation at community level helps to make Kenya more resilient through an informed population committed to a culture of prevention and reduction of disaster risks. Communities must be made aware of local risks they face, and the actions to be taken in the event of a disaster, as well as how to avoid the creation of future risks. General community safety education and sensitisation are carried out by a wide range of government and non-government organisations, each pursuing programmes aligned with their statutory responsibilities or organisational priorities. In addition, county and sub-county governments may identify specific communities as being at high risk from identified hazards, such as flooding, landslide, or coastal surge.

Where local communities are identified as being at high risk, community sensitisation and training programmes should be planned by the relevant CDRMC or the SCDRMC and published in the annual programme of activities set out in the annual plan. These community sensitisation and training programmes can assist people in understanding their risks, and the actions they can take to manage them. Examples of local programmes could include activities to ensure community members have a local flood plan, and that they understand local flood risk, how flood warnings may be received, and an understanding of flood shelter locations and safe evacuation routes.

4.1.4.2 | RESPONDER ORGANISATIONS

To ensure that all responder organisations can implement the generic ICS set out in the NERP, the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, through the NDOC in collaboration with other partners, will produce standardised training guidance and materials. The NDOC may also conduct national training programmes supporting the NERP, including specific input and guidance for personnel forming part of a UC.

Responsibility for all other elements of organisational training and capacity building rests with the MDAs, county government, NGOs or private sector organisations involved in emergency response. Where several organisations are involved in the delivery of the same emergency response function, as set out in **Chapter 5** below, the lead government department with overall responsibility for that function may establish common national training standards and materials, to ensure that all responders undertaking the same function are trained in a similar way and to similar standards so that they can work together and support each other in field operations.

Initial training sessions on risk critical response functions, such as the ICS, must be provided for all personnel to ensure that they acquire the required knowledge, skills and understanding to perform those tasks safely. Regular refresher training is also

required to ensure that personnel maintain competence. The frequency and type of refresher training for responders must be determined by the relevant MDA and recorded in their internal organisational training plan.

Without regular training or practical application, many specialist skills will degrade over time. To address the risk of skills decay, training must be planned to ensure that competence can be maintained. Taking skills decay into account, activities that are undertaken frequently, even if fairly high risk, may not require frequent training and refresher activities. However, activities that are only undertaken infrequently in day to day activities may require more regular training and refresher sessions to ensure competence is maintained. Regardless, it is recommended that refresher training and assessment sessions for risk critical response functions must be provided on an annual basis as a minimum.

In addition to their internal training needs, responder organisations must train regularly with the multi-agency and multi-sectoral partners with whom they would work in responding to an actual emergency. There multi-agency simulations and drills are an essential element of training and emergency preparedness. Further details about minimum multi-agency and multi-sectoral training frequencies are set out in **Section 4.2** below

4.1.5 SECTORAL PLANS AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPS)

Sectoral Plans and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) must be prepared by all MDAs and organisations having a response role under the NERP. Those Sectoral Plans and SOPs are required to set out the mode of activation and operation of the organisation and detail the actions to be taken by its personnel in support of the emergency response. For example, in case of a large fire, the NERP and CEOP will set out how emergency levels will be decided and the ICS structures that must be established and adopted by all responders. However, fire services are responsible for the production of Response Plans to determine firefighting tactics, and SOPs to detail how firefighting equipment should be used.

To ensure consistency across all responders, and for responses to all hazard types, the incident command and management arrangements within sectoral plans and SOPs must be consistent with the National ICS and terminology set out in the NERP. Further guidance on the production of supporting SOPs and plans is set out in **Annex 7**.

A SIMULATIONS AND DRILLS

4.2.1 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ORGANISATION OF SIMULATIONS AND DRILLS

Each MDA and organisation involved in emergency response is responsible for conducting its internal programme of exercises and drills, as identified through its internal review of preparedness activities.

Multi-agency training, drills and exercises provide a further level of preparedness and are vital to ensure that MDAs can work together effectively. Regular, formalised exercises and drills must be organised at the national, county and sub-county level, with additional and more frequent drills and simulations undertaken by response partners at a local level.

The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government through NDOC, in collaboration with other partners, will plan and carry out national exercises or drills on various scenarios. A proposed programme of annual training, exercises and drills will be included in the NDRMC Annual Report, approved by the Intergovernmental Council. County and sub-county government and individual MDAs are responsible for coordinating drills and exercises at their respective levels. A proposed programme of annual training, exercises and drills will be included in the CDRMC Annual Report, approved by the County Assembly, and shared with NDRMC. The schedule below provides guidance on the minimum frequency for all of these activities.

- a. There shall be at least one drill per year at the national level.
- b. There shall be at least one drill per year at the county and sub-county level
- c. Sectoral or agency-specific drills shall take place twice a year.

Lessons learnt from the drills and disaster incidents shall be reported through the CDRMC and the NDRMC Annual Reports so that they can be incorporated in the NERP and the CEOPs as appropriate.

The annual schedule for national drills and exercises shall be coordinated with the MolCNG and the NDOC, who shall monitor their delivery and provide guidance and

evaluation personnel as required. At the county level, an annual programme of planned training, exercises and drills shall be included in the annual report submitted for approval by County Assembly, along with feedback and any lessons learned from emergencies or training events in the previous year. Further details relating to arrangements at the county level are set out in the CEOP.

4.2.2 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Preparedness activities, including planning training and drills, will be monitored, and evaluated by the relevant UC Committee. Those monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities are required to measure progress towards planned objectives and implementation of preparedness activities, allowing adjustments and additions to be made to plans. Individual MDAs and responder organisations should establish their internal system for M&E, with reports submitted to the appropriate level of strategic management following any major exercise, drill, or response activation.

For annual exercises and drills organised at the national and county level, the monitoring and evaluation system should be designed to provide feedback to members of the relevant UC Committee to ensure accountability, transparency and facilitate appropriate decisions on future capacity building or to address any identified issues.

Feedback and lessons learned from national and county level exercises and drills should be forwarded to the Director of the NDOC so that they can be incorporated into regular reviews of the NERP and fed into the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES). The NDOC can also facilitate regular dissemination of lessons learned to all responder organisations in order to foster best practices.



INTEGRATION OF EP&R PLANNING WITH EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

Early warning systems form a key element of risk mitigation, and the systems and procedures for their identification and establishment must be set out in relevant MDA or sectoral plans. However, all early warning systems (EWS) consist of several interlinked activities, some of which are integral to emergency preparedness and response and must therefore be harmonised in the NERP and the CEOPs in addition to being recorded in MDA or sectoral plans.

Early warning systems are designed to monitor disruptive hazards and provide timely and advance warning of hazard events that have, or are likely to, breach a set threshold level. From an EPR perspective, the main purpose of an EWS is to facilitate early action, allowing all sections of society including citizens, government and non-government agencies and responders to prepare for, respond to, and recover from, any disruptive event resulting from the hazard being monitored.

Each EWS is designed to monitor different hazards and over different time periods. For example, warnings for slow-onset emergencies such as drought may be seasonal in nature, whereas those for flash flooding in an urban environment may need to react in a matter of minutes when heavy rains fall in a rapid reaction catchment or drainage system.

The purpose of an EWS is not limited to the issuing of a warning, it is to enable government and non-government entities, communities, and individuals to take early and effective actions to better protect lives and reduce the impact of an emergency on communities, the environment, and livelihoods.

Regardless of the hazard being monitored or its detailed system design, a comprehensive early warning system requires the delivery of four essential and interlinked technical components as presented in Figure 16 and detailed below:

I.RISK KNOWLEDGE: mapping and assessment of data on hazards, exposure, and vulnerabilities:

2.MONITORING AND WARNING: determining the hazards to be monitored and putting systems in place for their monitoring, then issuing a warning once agreed parameters have been breached:

3.DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION: Ensuring that any warning to communities and stakeholders is delivered effectively so that they can take early actions; and

4. RESPONSE CAPABILITY: An effective response by individuals, communities, government, and other institutions.

For any warning system to be effective, each of these technical elements needs to be addressed cohesively and none can be developed in isolation. To ensure that an EWS can be designed, delivered, and operated cohesively, a fifth essential element is also required: good governance achieved through a regulatory framework that establishes institutional and financial arrangements, and continuous political commitment.

The four technical component elements of an EWS, together with overarching governance and institutional framework, are presented in the figure below and developed in further detail in this section.

FIGURE 16: Early Warning System Components

Risk Knowledge

Systematically collect data and undertake risk assessments

Are de hazards and the vulnerabilities well known?

What are the patterns and trends in these

Are risk maps and data widely available?

Monitoring and Warning Service

Develop hazard monitoring and early warning services

Are the right parameters being monitored? Is the scientific basis for making forecasts?

Can accurate and timely warnings be generated?

Dissemination and Communication

Communicate risk information and early warnings

Do warnings reach all those at risk? Are the risks and warnings understood? Is the warning information clear and usable?

Response Capability

Build national and community response capabilities

Are response plans up to date and tested?

Are local capacities and knowledge made use of?

Are people prepared and ready to react to warnings?

SOURCE: World Bank 2020, adapted from UNISDR

RISK KNOWLEDGE

Appropriate assessment and understanding of risk requires a systematic collection of hazard information, as well as analysis of exposure and vulnerability in specific locations determined by dynamic human and environmental conditions. Risk assessment maps help prioritise early warning system needs and guide preparations for disaster prevention and response. Specific risk knowledge processes required for the establishment of EWS should be set out in the relevant sectoral plan.

MONITORING AND WARNING

A crucial EWS component, monitoring and warning services are generally provided by specialist MDAs with responsibility for providing hazard forecasts and warnings. To ensure the reliability of forecasts and warnings, it is essential to conduct continuous monitoring of hazard parameters and precursors and, where possible, to share institutional procedures and communication networks. These services generally remain operative 24 hours a day and throughout the year and must be described in relevant sectoral plans.

DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION

Warnings must reach those at risk. Clear messages containing simple and practical information are critical to enabling proper responses that will help safeguard lives and livelihoods. Area and community-level communication systems must be pre-identified and appropriate authoritative voices established. It is essential to use multiple communication channels to ensure that warnings reach the maximum number of people, and the information is conveyed in case of failure of a specific channel. DRMCs at national, county and sub-county level should be aware of the EWS available in their areas and should liaise with the responsible lead government MDA to identify methods for effective warning dissemination and communication within the areas for which they are responsible, including 'last mile' connectivity, ensuring the vulnerable and those most at risk receive any warnings issued. Disaster risk management committees should harness their understanding of the EWS in place to inform EPR planning.

RESPONSE CAPABILITY

Communities, government, and non-governmental entities need to understand the risks they face, understand what must be done in response to an early warning, and then practice their warning responses. Therefore, community education and awareness-raising programmes play a key role in ensuring an effective response to any EWS. To ensure an appropriate response from both responding agencies and community members, effective plans must be in place and regular practice drills and tests conducted. In particular, communities should receive clear and practical information on safe behaviour, for example, on available escape routes, guidance on how to avoid damage and loss to their property and animals.

Disaster Risk Management Committees (DRMC) Actions on Early Warning Systems

DRMCs at national, county and sub-county level should;

- a. Record all EWS applicable to their areas of responsibility.
- **b.** Liaise with the lead MDA responsible for the provision of the EWS, and ensure that plans for dissemination and communication, and response, are effective and harmonised with local response plans.
- **c.** Produce any supporting plans or SOPs necessary to give effect to the EWS. For example, identifying areas for evacuation in case of flooding, identification of safe evacuation routes and shelters.
- d. SCDRMCs have primary responsibility for community-level planning and engagement, supported by CDRMCs and the relevant lead MDA responsible for the EWS. Planning for the response to EWS should be community focussed and include 'last mile' connectivity for warning dissemination and communication, ensuring warnings reach all who need them, and identification of highly vulnerable persons requiring assistance to evacuate or take other protective actions.
- **e.** Government and non-governmental responders can use EWS to mobilise and preposition responders and logistical supplies. This requires EWS to be integrated into sectoral response plans.

PREPAREDNESS FOR EARLY RECOVERY

Preparedness for recovery involves several essential steps. This includes assessing recovery needs, developing institutional arrangements, preparing sector plans, implementing recovery interventions, and ensuring peoples' participation. When making plans for early recovery, it should be remembered that disasters may weaken in varying degrees the capacity of MDAs and local communities to assess, plan, and implement early recovery initiatives in a proactive and timely manner. Therefore, national, county, and sectoral response plans should include references to how early recovery will be managed and achieved. A key element of this planning will be the establishment of suitably trained teams to undertake Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA).

The main goal of conducting a PDNA is to assist governments to assess the full extent of a disaster's impact and, based on these findings, to produce an actionable and

sustainable recovery strategy for mobilising financial and technical resources. In addition, if necessary, request additional external cooperation and assistance to implement it, given the affected country's capacities, financial, technical, and institutional. More specifically a PDNA sets out the following objectives:

- → Support country-led assessments and initiate recovery planning processes through a coordinated inter-institutional platform integrating the concerted efforts of the United Nations system, the European Union, the World Bank, other participating international donors, financial institutions, and NGOs;
- → Evaluate the effect of the disaster on:
 - infrastructure and assets;
 - service delivery;
 - access to goods and services across all sectors, particularly the availability of basic services and the quality of service delivery;
 - governance and social processes; and
 - assessing needs to address underlying risks and vulnerabilities so as to reduce risk and 'build back better'.
- → Estimating the damage and loss caused by the disaster to physical infrastructure, productive sectors, and the economy, including an assessment of its macro-economic consequences;
- → Identify all recovery and reconstruction needs;
- → Develop the recovery strategy by outlining priority needs, recovery interventions, expected outputs and the cost of recovery and reconstruction which would form the basis for a comprehensive recovery framework; and
- → Provide the basis for mobilising resources for recovery and reconstruction through local, national and international sources.

International agencies and NGOs have teams trained and experienced in PDNA and may provide invaluable assistance in early recovery.

Given the diversity of emergencies that could potentially impact Kenya, there are many hundreds of separate response functions that may need to be delivered by a wide range of MDAs, NGOs, or private sector organisations. Whilst it is not the intention of the NERP to record every conceivable response function or activity or to list every organisation with a role in emergency response, it is important to establish as a matter of public record the lead ministries, departments and agencies with overall responsibility for critical functions at national and county level, and the primary MDAs, NGOs or private sector organisations that may play an important supporting role.

The NERP identifies six functional emergency response areas, each broken down into key sub-functions, along with the lead and supporting organisations responsible for each. This is intended to allow all responders to work individually or on a multi-agency basis to prepare for, and deliver, key emergency response functions and tasks. Emergency response activities, whether listed here or not, must be coordinated through the Kenya ICS and UC system set out in the NERP **Chapter 3.**

For the six critical emergency response areas and sub-functions listed in the NERP, the lead and supporting MDAs, NGOs, or private sector organisations are set out in **Table 3** below. A list of critical emergency response areas and sub-functions with an indication of lead and supporting bodies responsible for them is then set out in **Table 4**. The key purpose of setting out these tables in the NERP is to illustrate the wide range of government and non-government bodies involved in the delivery of each emergency response function, and it is anticipated that these lists will develop and change over time, as the NERP is implemented and a better appreciation of individual functions and the organisations involved is gained.

County Emergency Operation Plans to record the same list of critical emergency response areas and sub-functions but will provide an additional level of detail concerning county and local responders, NGOs, community groups and private sector organisations.

J ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE AREAS

Initial assignments of responsibility for leading emergency response tasks at the national or county level have been proposed by a stakeholder working group. Such proposals were then amended to take account of wider stakeholder feedback. ¹¹ However, the list of responsibilities should be viewed as a 'living document' and regularly reviewed and updated to reflect changes in ministry structure, legislation, or responder capabilities. Proposals to add or amend emergency response areas or sub-tasks, or the designation of lead and supporting agencies, should be brought to the attention of the NDRMC. The NDRMC will evaluate those proposals as part of the annual review of the NERP, taking forward any proposed amendments to the Intergovernmental Council for consideration and approval.

In determining the lead MDAs for each functional area, the approach taken by the stakeholder working group was to allocate the body with legal responsibility for that function, or in the absence of clear statutory duties, to one that possesses the most appropriate knowledge and skills for delivery of the response function. The MDAs given primary responsibility for an emergency function is expected to consult with all potential supporting partners, including the private sector, NGOs, and community groups, to identify all relevant agencies and organisations that will support response in that area.

Whilst the Intergovernmental council has overall responsibility for DRM policy and the NERP, the MDAs leading each response function are responsible for developing the technical and policy guidance necessary for the safe and effective delivery of response tasks for which they have lead responsibility. Therefore, it will be the responsibility of those MDAs to work will all necessary partners to produce and maintain sectoral

11. As articulated at a stakeholder workshop convened on 10th March 2020. Attendees included; the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), the National Disaster Operation Centre (NDOC), the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS), the Kenya Ministry of Health, the Kenya Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the State Department of Public Works (Structural Department), the Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning, the Ministry of Water, World Animal Protection, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, the Ministry of Defence and St. John Ambulance.

plans, standard operating procedures, and checklists which detail how their assigned task will be performed. This planning and consultation may be undertaken through the DRMC structure established in the NERP.

Where it is unclear which, if any, ministry or department should be designated as the lead MDA, the Intergovernmental Council may nominate a lead, or retain the role at national Level by appointing an *ad hoc* committee to provide leadership and produce the necessary plans and SOPs. In some cases, the MDA designated as lead at national and county levels may be different. In these circumstances, the national MDA will establish national protocols and general guidance to which county-level lead MDAs will adhere. County-level MDAs will produce plans that contextualise general national guidance to suit the circumstances and context at the county level.

The disaster response capabilities developed by Kenyan lead and supporting MDAs must be suitable and enough to manage the range of foreseeable disasters that may impact the Country. The process of identifying preparedness requirements set out in **Section 4.1.2** will assist in identifying the 'worst credible' emergencies that may impact Kenya at national, county and sub-county levels. These reference threat scenarios can be used for assessment of the capabilities required for an effective response, including identification of the entity that will make that response. They will also inform assessments and gap analyses to identify whether the capacity of responders is sufficient to manage the anticipated scale of the emergency. Development of realistic reference threat scenarios, supported by risk and other assessment data, can also inform the design of detailed sectoral response plans, and the supporting SOPs and checklists required by responders to enact those plans.

Response organisations delivering functions not listed in this chapter may follow the same generic processes and approaches set out in the NERP to develop their sectoral response plans, SOPs and checklists. These should be developed in consultation with Disaster Risk Management Committees at the relevant level, and in partnership with other responders as required.

J. LIST OF RESPONSE ENTITIES

The following list does not include all potential ministries, departments, agencies, i/ NGOs and private sector organisations that may be called upon to contribute to

emergency response, but has been drawn up by stakeholders to represent the primary organisations involved in the delivery of the six critical emergency response areas identified.

 TABLE 3:
 List of Responding Entities in Kenya

Acronym	Entity
MolCNG	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government
MoDA	Ministry of Devolution and the ASALs
MoWSI	Ministry of Water & Sanitation and Irrigation
МоН	Ministry of Health
MoALF	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries
MoTIHUDP	Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Public Works
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoFE	Ministry of Environment and Forestry
MoICT	Ministry of Information, Communications and Technology
MoEP	Ministry of Energy and Petroleum
MoFAIT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
NDOC	National Disaster Operations Centre
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NDMU	National Disaster Management Unit
KCAA	Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
NTSA	National Transport and Safety Authority
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
WRA	Water Resources Authority
CG	County Governments
NPS	The National Police Service
FRS	Fire & Rescue Services
NYS	The National Youth Service
KMD	Kenya Meteorological Department

Acronym	Entity
КМА	Kenya Maritime Authority
МН	Major Hospitals
KAA	Kenya Airports Authority
KSJA	Kenya St. John Ambulance
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
IS	Insurance Sector
UNA	United Nations Agencies
СВО	Community-Based Organisations
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
PC	Power Companies
WSP	Water Service Providers
тс	Telecommunications Companies

FUNCTIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE AREAS AND PRIMARY SUB-TASKS

An overview of the six functional emergency response areas and primary sub tasks are set out below. **Table 4** details the lead and supporting MDAs for each area and sub-task.

FUNCTIONAL AREA I: RESCUE AND ENVIRONMENT

<u>PURPOSE AND GOALS:</u> Coordinating and providing the set of immediate actions carried out by the population and the relevant first response agencies, with the aim of saving lives, controlling secondary events such as fires, explosions, leaks, protecting assets and maintaining public safety.

SCOPE/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS: To mobilise teams for locating, rescuing and providing first aid to the wounded, providing support to control secondary events such as fires, hazardous materials, as well as guaranteeing safety and security to the population and the emergency personnel, including evacuating the population exposed to imminent risk.

SUB TASKS:

- 1.1. Search and Rescue Sea
- 1.2. Search and Rescue Land
- 1.3. Fire Fighting
- 1.4. Evacuation of affected/at-risk areas
- 1.5. Environmental protection
- 1.6. Emergencies of Hazardous Materials

FUNCTIONAL AREA II: SECURITY

<u>PURPOSE AND GOALS:</u> Functional Area II describes key response measures to maintain law and order and internal security and resolve internal conflicts.

<u>SCOPE/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS:</u> Once a security situation occurs, it begins with the mobilisation of personnel and equipment to maintain law and order in accordance with the Constitution and the management of any internal security operations.

This requires the establishment of robust ICS as events may develop quickly and tactics will need to change to address the situation presented.

Conflict resolution strategies include negotiation with impacted communities in order to find ways to avoid conflict, reach compromises or accommodations, and collaborating.

SUB TASKS:

- 2.1 Law and Order
- 2.2 Conflict Resolution
- 2.3 Internal Security Operations

FUNCTIONAL AREA III: HEALTH

<u>PURPOSE AND GOALS:</u> This functional area describes how medical assistance will be coordinated in response to public health and medical care needs following a major disaster or emergency, or during a developing potential medical situation.

SCOPE/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS: Once the emergency occurs, it begins with the mobilisation of personnel, goods, equipment and supplies to the impact area, patient identification, and transport (depending on level of complexity) according to the approved plans. It continues then throughout the emergency. Actions include hospital care, control of epidemiological surveillance,

environmental health (management of vectors and domestic animals, basic sanitation), mental health and management of bodies.

SUB TASKS:

- 3.1. Pre-hospital Care
- 3.2. Hospital Care
- 3.3. Epidemiological Surveillance
- 3.4. Environmental Health
- 3.5. Animal Health and Welfare
- 3.6. Dead Body Handling
- 3.7. Psychological/Mental Health Support

FUNCTIONAL AREA IV: HUMANITARIAN SERVICES

<u>PURPOSE AND GOALS:</u> Humanitarian services aims to develop and coordinate the actions related to the care and treatment of those affected by emergencies or disasters, especially, regarding the provision of shelter, food and basic needs, and the protection of vulnerable groups (minors, pregnant women, individuals with disabilities, sick persons and the elderly).

SCOPE/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS: It starts once the number of affected persons has been identified and measured (categorised by family group, gender, age, special conditions, and basic needs required), taking into consideration the socio-cultural context in each area. This information is essential to understand the basic needs and specialised care of individuals with special conditions and vulnerable groups.

SUB TASKS:

- **4.1.** Registration
- 4.2. Shelter Installation and Management
- 4.3. Food Assistance
- 4.4. Protection of Vulnerable Groups

FUNCTIONAL AREA V: ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

<u>PURPOSE AND GOALS</u>: Essential infrastructure services will monitor natural and/or human-induced events, and assess damage to essential services, basic sanitation (water, sewage and solid waste), energy, telecommunications, transportation, and the environment, in order to define the actions to be taken by the authorities for the protection of life and property, and for the rapid re-establishment of services and recovery of the environment.

SCOPE/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS: Actions associated with this Functional Area begin with the identification and estimation of damages (determining area affected by the event) and the state of critical infrastructure (water,

sanitation, energy, telecommunications, transport) and the environment, the consolidation and organisation of information on damages and the planning and prioritisation of emergency management for these services. The process ends with the rehabilitation/early recovery of the various systems, including schools and markets.

SUB TASKS:

- 5.1. Assessment of Disaster Risks
- 5.2. Restoration of Communications Services
- 5.3. Restoration of Transport Services
- 5.4. Restoration of Water and Sanitation Services
- 5.5. Restoration of Energy Services
- 5.5 Restoration of Markets and Schools

FUNCTIONAL AREA VI: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

<u>PURPOSE AND GOALS</u>: This Functional Area will lead emergency responses through coordination of national and sub-national entities by establishing decisions to be translated into effective response actions, based on timely information. It will also design and keep track of actions for early recovery.

SCOPE/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS: Actions in this Area begin once the characteristics of a large-scale event are identified, and an emergency level is declared. If required, the various Unified Commands (UC) at national, county and sub-county levels according to the National Emergency Response Plan and County Emergency Operation Plan can be convened to decide on the best course of actions.

Information relating to the emergency is analysed and processed for the prioritisation and coordination of responses and the ensuing rehabilitation work, and to inform emergency declarations according to impact and territorial distribution.

A Comprehensive Incident Action Plan is established for managing the various emergency response actions at each UC, followed by continuous monitoring of their implementation, taking decisions, making the necessary adjustments, and guaranteeing appropriate legal support and technical, human, and financial resources.

Throughout the response process, those responsible for the emergency management structure must ensure continuous reporting on the impact and existing risks resulting from the event, safety recommendations, specific response, and relief actions, and how to have access to relief/aid are provided.

SUB TASKS:

- 6.1. Comprehensive Planning and Emergency Coordination
- **6.2.** Public Information
- 6.3. Legal and Administrative Affairs
- **6.4.** Coordination of Damage and Needs Assessment
- 6.5. Management of Information and Communications

- **6.6.** Coordination of International Cooperation
- **6.7.** Coordination between Jurisdictions of the Country, NGOs and the Private Sector
- **6.8.** Resource Management

 TABLE 4:
 List of Emergency Response Areas and Primary Entity Responsible

Area	Function	Lead MDA Responsible	Supporting Entities				
1.0 RES	1.0 RESCUE AND ENVIRONMENT						
1.1	Search and Rescue at Sea	Kenya Maritime Authority	MolCNG MoD MolCT NDOC NDMU KCCA KRCS				
1.2	Search and Rescue – Land	County Government	MoICNG MoD MoICT NDOC NDMU KCCA KRCS NGOs				
1.3	Fire fighting	The National Police Service	MoD MoICT NDOC NCTC				
1.4	Evacuation of at-risk areas	County Government, assisted by The National Police Service	MoD MoICT NDOC NDMU KRCS CBO NGOs				
1.5	Environmental protection	National Environment Management Authority	MoALF MoFE WRA CBO NGOs				
1.6	Hazardous materi- als emergencies	Fire & Rescue Services	MoD NDOC NDMU KMD				

Area	Function	Lead MDA Responsible	Supporting Entities			
2.0 SECURITY						
2.1	Law and order	The National Police Service	NDOC NDMU KAA			
2.2	Conflict resolution	Ministry of Defence	MoFE CG CBO NGOs			
2.3	Internal security operations	MoD Ministry of Defence	NCTC			
3.0 HEA	3.0 HEALTH					
3.1	Pre-hospital care	Ministry of Health (national) Major Hospitals (county)	KSJA KRCS CBO NGOs			
3.2	Hospital care	Ministry of Health (national) Major Hospitals (county)				
3.3	Epidemiological surveillance	Ministry of Health (national) County Government and Major Hospitals (county)	NDOC NDMU UNA			
3.4	Environmental health	Ministry of Health (national) County Government (county)	NDOC NDMU KRCS UNA NGOs			
3.5	Animal welfare and services	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries	NGOs CBO			
3.6	Management of dead bodies	County Government and Major Hospitals (county)	NDOC NDMU FRS KSJA KRCS CBO			
3.7	Psychological/men- tal health support	County Government and Major Hospitals (county)	MoH KSJA CBO NGOs			

Area	Function	Lead MDA Responsible	Supporting Entities			
4.0 HUI	4.0 HUMANITARIAN SERVICES					
4.1	Registration	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (national) National Disaster Operations Centre County Governments (county)	KRCS NGOs			
4.2	Shelter installa- tion and management	National Disaster Operations Centre (national) County Governments (county)	MoTIHUDP NDMU WRA KRCS CBO NGOs			
4.3	Food assistance	National Disaster Operations Centre (national) County Governments (county)	MoALF NDMU KRCS CBOL NGOs			
4,4	Protection of vulnerable groups	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (national) Ministry of Health (national) National Disaster Operations Centre (national) County Governments (county)	NPS KRCS CBO NGOs			
5.0 ESS	ENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE A	ND SERVICES				
5.1	Assessment of disaster and risks	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (national) National Disaster Management Unit (national)	NPS KRCS CBO NGOs			
5.2	Restoration of communications	County Governments	NDOC NDMU			
5.3	Restoration of transport services	Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Planning (national) Ministry of Information, Communications and Technology (national) Telecommunications Companies (national and county)	NDOC NDMU			
5.4	Restoration of water and sanitation services	Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Planning (national) Kenya Airports Authority (national and county)	NDOC NDMU CG			
5.5	Restoration of mar- kets and education	Water Resources Authority (WRA) (national) Water Service Providers (national and county) County Governments (county)	CBO NGOs			

Area	Function	Lead MDA Responsible	Supporting Entities		
5.6	Restoration of energy services	Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Planning (national) Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (national) Power Companies (national and county)	NDOC NDMU		
6.0 EM	6.0 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT				
6.1	Comprehensive planning and emergency coordination	National Disaster Operations Centre (national) National Disaster Management Unit (national) County Governments (county)	NCTC WRA NPS KRCS		
6.2	Public information	Ministry of Information, Communications and Technology (national) National Disaster Operations Centre (national) County Governments (county)	NDMU WRA KMD KRCS CBO NGOs		
6.3	Legal and admin- istrative affairs	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government National Disaster Operations Centre (national) County Governments (county)	MoFE		
6.4	Coordination of damage and needs assessment	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (national) National Disaster Operations Centre (national) County Governments (county)	NDMU WRA KRCS UNA NGOs IS		
6.5	Coordination of international assistance	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (national) National Disaster Operations Centre (national) County Governments (county)	NDMU KCCA UNA NGOs		
6.6	Coordination between jurisdictions of the country, NGOs, and the private sector	Ministry of Devolution and the ASALs (national) Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (national) NDOC National Disaster Operations Centre (national) County Governments (county)	NDMU KRCS UNA NGOs		
6.7	Resource management	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (na- tional) National Disaster Management Unit (national) County Governments (county)	WRA NPS KRCS		





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NATIONAL POLICY DIRECTION FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

National policy direction for emergency preparedness and response is provided by two key bodies, reflecting the different requirements for policy coordination and direction relating to emergency preparedness, and for the provision of policy direction during a response to a national level emergency. Matters relating to national preparedness policy are managed by the Intergovernmental Council. During a national emergency, policy direction relating to emergency response and recovery efforts falls to the National Security Council.

I. NATIONAL POLICY FORMULATION FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Responsibility for the oversight of emergency preparedness at the national level, including policy formulation, is vested in the Intergovernmental Council (when established).

The national policy function of the Intergovernmental Council in supporting national preparedness includes the provision of;

- a. Advice and recommendations to Cabinet;
 - · on matters relating to Disaster Risk Management; and
 - on the establishment of a national framework for Disaster Risk Management aimed at ensuring an integrated and uniform approach to Disaster Risk Management in

- the republic by all national, county, non-governmental institutions involved in disaster risk management, the private sector, communities and individuals.
- **b.** Provide policy direction and approve plans on all activities related to disaster risk management;
- **c.** Receive, consider, and make decisions based on the reports relating to disaster risk management;
- d. Co-ordinate and monitor intergovernmental multi-sectoral entities responsible for disaster risk management; and
- **e.** Report to Cabinet on the co-ordination of disaster risk management among the spheres of government.

2. MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL

Core Membership of the Intergovernmental Council includes:

- **a.** The Cabinet Secretary responsible for the time being with Disaster Risk Management, who shall be the Chairperson;
- b. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for the time being for inter-governmental relations;
- c. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for the time being for the National Treasury;
- d. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for the time being for Health;
- e. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for the time being for Defence;
- f. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for the time being for Public Service;
- g. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for the time being for Agriculture;
- **h.** The Cabinet Secretary responsible for the time being for Drought Risk Management; and
- i. Three representatives from the Council of Governors (CoG), one of whom shall be the Chairperson of the Council of Governors;

Core members may be assisted by additional invited members who may be co-opted to assist the Intergovernmental Council in its preparedness role. Invited Members will be appointed by the Chair of the Intergovernmental Council for a specified period as may be necessary to assist in the proper discharge of its functions of the Council.

The Intergovernmental Council shall meet at least four times in a year, and shall submit an annual report to the National Assembly, the Senate and the county assemblies, within three months after the end of every financial year.

3. NATIONAL POLICY FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE – THE 'PLATINUM' INCIDENT COMMAND FUNCTION

During an emergency requiring national leadership, policy direction and the 'Platinum Function' in the Kenyan National Incident Command System (ICS) will be undertaken by the National Security Council (NSC). Platinum is the ultimate level of Unified Command decision making in the Kenyan ICS. Members of the NSC represent a Unified Command (UC) and in addition to any other duties have primary responsibility for;

- a. Providing national policy direction for emergency response and recovery operations,
- b. Ensuring a whole of government response to major disasters,
- c. Strategic oversight and direction of emergency response and recovery,
- d. Consideration of requests for international assistance

4. MEMBERSHIP AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NSC AS SET OUT IN PART 2 OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT NO. 23 OF 2012

Membership of the National Security Council (NSC), its functions and administration, are set out in the National Security Act No. 23 of 2012. The Council consists of:

- a. The President;
- **b.** The Deputy President;
- c. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for Defence;
- d. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for Foreign Affairs;
- e. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for Internal Security;
- f. The Attorney General;
- g. The Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces;
- h. The Director-General of the National Intelligence Service; and
- i. The Inspector General of the National Police Service.

When forming a UC, the NSC will establish appropriate command support functions as set out in **Section 3.5** of this Plan. In doing so, the NSC may appoint staff from any supporting authority to undertake these specialist command support roles as appropriate.

Conduct of the business of the NSC will be following the First Schedule [Section 6(1)] of the National Security Act No. 23 of 2012

When acting as a Unified Command and undertaking the Platinum Function:

- a. The Chair of the NSC is empowered to invite or co-opt any other member to the Committee that they believe is necessary for the safe and effective resolution of an emergency;
- b. The Chair of the NSC shall establish, or cause to be established, a Unified Command secretariat consisting of a Command and General Staff as set out in Chapter 3 of the NERP; and
- **c.** The Chair of the NSC may invite any disaster risk management authority or technical committee to provide technical assistance to the NSC or to take a role within the UC secretariat as appropriate.

MEMBERSHIP AND FUNCTION OF NDRMC

Operational and technical matters relating to emergency preparedness and response are coordinated nationally through a single National Disaster Risk Management Committee (NDRMC). The NDRMC is responsible for ensuring the effective coordination of the emergency preparedness and response activities of all ministries, departments, and agencies, along with responders from NGOs and the private sector. The NDRMC may be formally constituted as a committee of the National Disaster Risk Management Authority (NDRMA) (when established).

I. MEMBERSHIP OF THE NDRMC

The NDRMC consists of a core membership that shall be gazetted in the Kenya Gazette with a facility for additional invited members to be co-opted by the Chair to assist in the delivery of specific committee functions.

Core membership includes Board Members of the NDRMA (when established) and key officials from that Authority, including as a minimum:

- a. Chairperson, who shall be the Chair of the NDRMA appointed by the President;
- **b.** The Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for matters relating to disaster risk management;
- c. The Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for intergovernmental relations;
- d. The Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for Finance;
- e. The Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for Health;
- f. The Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for Agriculture;
- g. The Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for Environment
- h. The Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for Drought Risk Management;
- i. The Solicitor General;
- i. A representative of the Kenya Red Cross Society;

k. A representative of the Kenya Private Sector Alliance
 I. The Chief Executive Officer of the Council of Governors; and
 m. The Director-General of the NDRMA

Core members may be assisted by additional invited members who may be co-opted to assist the NDRMC in its preparedness or response role. For example, in planning for a health emergency, or managing a response to a health-related emergency, additional health experts may be invited to assist and advise the core members of NDRMC.

Invited members will be appointed by the Chair of the NDRMC for a specified period as may be necessary to assist in the proper discharge of its functions of the committee.

2. PREPAREDNESS PLANNING

The NDRMC may assist the NDRMA (when established) in delivery of its responsibilities for multi-agency coordination of preparedness activities. The multi-agency and multi-disciplinary nature of the NDRMC, including both core members from NDRMA and additional invited members from the wider responder community, will assist in the planning and delivery of national preparedness activities. NDRMC will produce an annual programme of planned preparedness works that will be included in the NDRMC annual report submitted to the Intergovernmental Council for consideration. The NDRMC annual report may also be included in the NDRMA annual report.

The NDRMC will also review annual and after-action reports from each CDRMC whose members shall be gazetted in the County Gazette, identifying lessons learned and sharing these amongst all CDRMCs and responder stakeholders at the national and county level. NDRMC will submit an annual report to the Intergovernmental Council setting out:

- a. The activities undertaken by the NDRMC during the year;
- **b.** Results of the initiatives undertaken by the NDRMC for purposes of disaster prevention and mitigation;
- **c.** Information on the disasters that occurred during the year in the country together with information on:
- d. Their classification, magnitude, and severity of disasters;
- e. The impact of the disasters; and
- f. challenges experienced in dealing with the disasters;
- **g.** The utilisation of the Disaster Risk Management Fund established pursuant to the Public Finance Management Act, 2012;
- **h.** The status of the preparation of /and any updates to, existing disaster risk management plans and strategies in the country; and
- **i.** An evaluation based on the approved template/format, of the implementation of disaster risk management plans and strategies in each county.

The NDRMC annual report may be incorporated as a section of the National Disaster Risk Management Authority annual report (when established).

3. NATIONAL OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

During an emergency requiring national direction, the NDRMC will establish a multi-agency and multi-sectoral unified command to undertake the 'Gold Function' as set out in the NERP and Kenyan Incident Command System (ICS). Gold is the senior technical/operational level of unified command, responsible for providing the necessary focus and direction to ensure that all available resources from government and civil society can be harnessed and coordinated effectively at the national level.

When activated to form a unified command, the NDRMC shall report to and take instructions and policy direction from, the National Security Council (NSC). In addition to any other duties, during a national emergency where the Gold level of functional command is activated, NDRMC will have primary responsibility for:

- → Ensuring that the strategic level heads of all relevant MDAs involved in response and recovery operations, including NGOs and private sector heads as appropriate, can blend together and create an effective unified command team;
- → Developing a national overview of the operational situation, including an assessment of hazards and risks, and the strategic options and priorities for the response;
- → The management and coordination of strategic operations at the national level, maximising the use of all available resources and enhancing the efficiency of individual response organisations;
- → Producing a National Incident Action Plan that sets out the operational strategies and plans necessary to achieve the policy objectives set by the NSC;
- → Ensure the effective sharing of information with all MDAs and responders, and across all levels of response; and
- → Provide information and direction to County Disaster Risk Management Committees (CDRMCs) undertaking the Silver function (during Level 3 and 4 responses).

4. SECRETARIAT STRUCTURE SUPPORTING NDRMC IN ITS RESPONSE ROLE

To undertake the unified command role, the NDRMC must be supported by a secretariat function comprising two staff groups as set out in **Section 3.5** of the NERP, a Command, and General Staff.

Appointments to Command and General Staff positions will be made by the Chair of NDRMC, advised by the Director-General of the NDRMA (*when established*). It is anticipated that the NDRMA staff will be trained to undertake key secretariat roles, supported by additional specialists from the relevant lead ministry, department or agency having primary responsibility.



ANNEX 3.

ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF UNIFIED COMMANDS

UNIFIED COMMAND ACTIVATION LEVELS

International lessons identified from emergencies, including floods, cyclones and other natural hazard events, show that activating unified command (UC) structures at an early stage on a precautionary basis can be extremely helpful in ensuring national, county and local responders are ready if a situation suddenly worsens.

Unified command structures may be activated at the technical level only, without the need to physically convene all members of the relevant UC committee or secretariat staff group members at the outset. In these circumstances, other appropriate means can be used to share information between relevant partners to assess and monitor the extent of the emergency. Should full activation of the UC subsequently become necessary, key information and data will be already available and delays in establishing the UC will be reduced.

In recognition of these considerations, the UC will function according to the following Activation Levels as determined by the Chair of each UC:

FIGURE A3.1: Unified Command Activation Levels

None	Normal Activity
Level 1	Situation Monitoring
Level 2	Partial Activation
Level 4	Full Activation

SOURCE:

The consultant, 2020

During Normal Activity (Green Status): the nominated duty officers at national, county and sub-county level will maintain their normal day-to-day operations and working arrangements. A 24-hour-a-day,7-days a week (24/7) roster of on-call Duty Officers should be established at each level to act as the first point of contact for emergency-related information. They will liaise as required with the Chair of the relevant UC Committee, or any other person as appointed by the Chair, to determine whether an emergency declaration is appropriate and the UC activated, and if so, at what level.

LEVEL 1: SITUATION MONITORING (COLOUR CODED YELLOW)

At Level 1 (Yellow Status): The role of the UC duty officer and secretariat staff is to monitor and follow-up on any impending threat, an unusual event, or situation that has the potential to escalate and require the establishment of a UC at the level for which they are responsible. If they believe a situation may require a Level 1 activation, they shall inform the UC Chair and seek a determination. Level 1 activation is typically an internal activation of relevant staff from the UC Secretariat Command and General Staff groups as required but without the full establishment of the relevant UC Committee. At this level of activation, UC staff groups operate as a monitoring and support function and as no formal decision-making role is required, the UC Committee for that level is not activated. For Level 1 UC activations, the threat or situation simply warrants observation, verification of appropriate action, and follow-up by secretariat staff, as necessary.

During a Level 1 activation of a UC the on-call Duty Officer, along with any other secretariat team members they deem necessary, will provide 24-hour monitoring of the situation, either from an EOC facility (where available) or remotely. The Chair of the relevant UC Committee, or any other person appointed by them, will be kept informed of the situation and may determine whether escalation of the UC alert level is warranted.

Level 1 UC Activation can be envisaged under the following circumstances—this list is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive:

- **a.** An event that has resulted in the establishment of a UC at a lower level, even though, at this stage, it is not thought likely to escalate further and require full activation of the UC at the next level.
- **b.** Early warning is received of a potential hazard, such as an incoming weather system, rising floodwaters, or any other identified potential threat that is yet to materialise.

THE PURPOSE OF LEVEL I ACTIVATION IS TO:

- → Ensure the Chair of the UC Committee, or a person appointed by the Chair, is informed of a developing situation and that UC secretariat staff is brought to an appropriate state of alert.
- → Prepare for an imminent event or monitor an on-going localised event for potential escalation.
- → Provide an efficient means of managing and disseminating emergency information (internal and external).

REQUIRED PERSONNEL RESOURCES:

- → UC Duty Officer;
- → Additional UC Secretariat team members at the request of the Duty Officer.

LEVEL 2: PARTIAL ACTIVATION (COLOUR CODED ORANGE)

At Level 2 (Orange Status): The role of the UC is typically a transitional, limited activation to provide auxiliary support to lower level UC in the management of localised disaster operations, or to monitor an ongoing localised incident for potential escalation; and/or to initiate preparations due to a significant disaster or threat of a disaster.

Level 2 UC activation is initiated by the Chair of the UC Committee, or any other person as appointed by the Chair. At Level 2, UC secretariat staff plus selected UC Committee members as identified by the UC Committee Chair may be mobilised to the UC EOC in an advisory capacity, even though a formal declaration of an incident level has not been made. The Duty officer of the next level UC in the national chain of command will be informed whenever UC is activated at Level 2. For example, if county-level UC is activated at level 2, the national duty officer at NDRMC will be informed.

Level 2 UC activation can be envisaged under the following circumstances—this list is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive:

- a. A significant Emergency incident in progress impacting a lower level UC that requires an additional level of oversite for coordination of resources or supporting actions by a higher level, but without the need for that higher-level UC to assume overall command of the emergency response.
- b. During an escalating incident with possible national impacts

During Level 2 Activation, the UC will be operational as the situation warrants.

THE PURPOSE OF LEVEL 2 ACTIVATION IS TO:

- → Provide enhanced coordination and support during an on-going local incident impacting a lower level UC.
- → Ensure that appropriate agencies are fully coordinated and prepared to respond should events escalate
- → Efficiently manage information flow between primary responders, the media, and the public.

REQUIRED PERSONNEL RESOURCES:

- → UC Committee Chair or a person appointed by the Chair.
- → UC Committee members as deemed necessary by the UC Committee Chair or a person appointed by the Chair.
- → UC Secretariat Command or General Staff as deemed necessary by the UC Committee Chair or a person appointed by the Chair.

LEVEL 3: FULL ACTIVATION (COLOUR CODED RED)

Full activation of the UC and all supporting structures provides a focal point for coordination and management of emergency response at that level, as set out in the NERP and the CEOP. Level 3 activation of the UC is initiated by the UC Committee Chair or a person appointed by the Chair. The Duty Officer of the next level UC will be informed immediately when a Level 3 activation has taken place so that they may inform their Chair and consider the requirement to activate their level of UC.

Level 3 UC activation can be envisaged under the following non-inclusive circumstances; this list is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive:

- → At sub-county Level 1 response, full activation of UC will occur when a significant local emergency has occurred or is expected to occur, that involves a significant local response and/or requires coordination of external resources from the county or national level.
- → At county Level 2 response, full activation of UC will occur when significant impacts over large parts of the county are expected to occur or have already occurred, and/ or an incident of local socio-political significance has, or is expected to, occur.
- → At the national Level 3 response, full activation of the operational UC will occur for events that overwhelm a county and require national coordination or mobilisation of national resources. It may also be triggered by an indecent where the impacts may be less significant but are so geographically widespread that it necessitates two or more County UCs to be established. National Policy level UC may be activated for Level 3 responses on the instructions of the Chair, depending on the circumstances arising.

→ At national Level 4 response, full activation of all levels of UC will occur for events that overwhelm the existing national response capacity, thus prompting the President to seek regional/international assistance to support the country in response and recovery.

During a Level 3 UC activation, UCs will remain operational 24 hours per day for the duration of the response effort, and until the UC Committee Chair has authorised demobilisation.

THE PURPOSE OF LEVEL 3 ACTIVATION IS TO:

- → Ensure the UC Committee is convened and that secretariat support functions are fully staffed and ready to meet the needs of the situation;
- → Ensure the effective communication and liaison between UCs at the sub-county, county, and national levels; and
- → Ensure effective coordination between all ministries, departments, agencies, NGOs, and private sector organisations, and ensuring effective resource support, financial management, and public information.

REQUIRED PERSONNEL RESOURCES INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING:

- → The UC Committee Chair, or any other person as appointed by the Chair;
- → UC Committee 'Core members;
- → UC Committee 'invited' members;
- → Any other persons deemed necessary by the UC Committee Chair may be invited to join the UC Committee to assist in the management of the response and early recovery;
- → UC Secretariat including Command and General Staff teams deemed necessary by the UC Committee Chair on the advice of the Operations Section Chief;
- → The UC Command and General Staff teams will activate advisory subcommittees or task teams as required within their functional area, depending on the operational requirements and circumstances.

COMMUNICATIONS AND LINKS BETWEEN VARIOUS LEVELS OF UNIFIED COMMAND

INCIDENT INFORMATION FLOW

Effective information flow is essential to efficient emergency response. One of the primary concerns for the UC at each level is the efficient assimilation, movement, and dissemination of information between UCs at all levels, response agencies, stakeholders, and the public at large. A robust communications system is critical in facilitating this flow of information.

The NERP and the UC structure enables this communication flow in the following ways:

<u>A. UPWARDS:</u> Reporting all information, decisions, and situational reports through the chain of command facilitates effective situational awareness, coordination and decision making at all levels.


<u>B. LATERALLY OR ACROSS:</u> Reporting and information sharing between all MDAs and organisations involved in the response achieved through UCs established at each functional level: national policy, national operations, county and sub-county levels. The regular exchange of information between organisations at each response level enables a common operational picture to be established and effective multi-agency and multi-sectoral plans to be established.

<u>C.INTERNALLY OR WITHIN:</u> Each representative at the UC reports back to their respective organisation from where it can be exchanged through the different structures and hierarchies of the organisation. In addition to sharing information, decision-makers forming the UC Committee will issue instructions back to their organisations, ensuring that the actions taken align with the agreed Incident Action Plan.

<u>D. EXTERNALLY OR OUTWARDS:</u> t is essential to provide accurate, timely and authoritative information and guidance for the impacted community and general public at large.

Figure A3.2 below shows how all of the information pathways that emanate from and need to be controlled by, the UC at each functional level.

FIG A3.2: UC Communications Pathways



SOURCE:

P. Hayden 2015, National Response Plan, Republic of Mauritius

In addition to maintenance of good communications between each UC Committee, specialists working in secretariat functions will also maintain close contact with their opposite numbers in other UCs. For example, the Operations Section Chief in each UC is expected to maintain regular communications with the Operations Section Chief at the next level UC to keep them updated on the situation locally. The Planning Section Chief at the senior UC established for the emergency will establish a timetable for submission of Common Recognised Information Picture (CRIP) reports from each UC operating beneath it in the command chain, although this should not limit the earlier exchange of information should the situation on the ground demand. A template for the production of the CRIP reports is set out in **Annex 3c** below.

DECISION-MAKING MODEL FOR THE UC COMMITTEE

When bringing together decision-makers from multiple MDAs at the UC, a common decision-making model is useful in avoiding confusion and misunderstanding. A wide range of decision-making models exists, including specific models used by individual agencies, to practically support decision-makers working under difficult circumstances. A guiding principle is that they should not be over complicated to avoid the risk that they will be too complex to follow during an actual emergency.

In addition to having a single decision-making model for multi-agency groups, one of the difficulties facing decision-makers from different organisations in a joint emergency response is how to bring together the available information, reconcile objectives and then make effective decisions together. A Joint Decision Model (JDM), shown in **Figure A3.3**, has been developed to enable this to happen.

In common with most decision models, the JDM is organised around three primary considerations:

<u>SITUATION:</u> What is happening, what are the impacts, what are the risks, what might happen and what is being done about it? Situational awareness is having appropriate knowledge of these factors.

<u>DIRECTION:</u> What end state is desired, what are the aims and objectives of the emergency response and recovery efforts, and what overarching values and priorities will inform and guide this?

<u>ACTION:</u> What needs to be decided, what needs to be done, and by who, to resolve the situation and achieve the desired end state?

The JDM develops these considerations and sets out the various stages of how joint decisions should be reached. One of the guiding principles of the JDM is that decision-makers will use their judgement and experience in deciding what additional questions to ask and considerations to take into account, to reach a jointly agreed decision.

Members of UC Committees must, therefore, be free to interpret the JDM for themselves, reasonably and according to the circumstances facing them at any given time. Strict adherence to the stepped process outlined in the JDM should always be secondary to achieving desired outcomes, particularly in time-sensitive situations. A detailed and well-practised understanding of the JDM will facilitate clear and ordered thinking under stress. The following sections summarise the questions and considerations that UC Committee members should think about in following the model.

FIG A3.3: Joint Decision-Making Model



SOURCE: Adapted from UK Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Manual 2017

WORKING TOGETHER: SAVING LIVES, REDUCING HARM

Joint decisions must be made concerning the overarching or primary aim of any response to an emergency: to save lives and reduce harm. This is achieved through a coordinated, multiagency response. Decision-makers should have this uppermost in their minds throughout the decision-making process.

Gather and share information and intelligence.

Situational awareness is about having appropriate answers to the following questions:

- a. What is happening;
- b. What are the impacts;
- c. What are the risks;
- d. What might happen; and
- e. What is being done about it?

In the context of the JDM, shared situational awareness becomes critically important. Shared situational awareness is achieved by sharing information and understanding between the organisations involved, and between the UCs established at sub-county, county and national levels of response, in order to build a stronger, multi-dimensional awareness of events, their implications, associated risks and potential outcomes.

For major and complex emergencies, it unlikely that a single MDA can initially appreciate all relevant dimensions of an emergency. This deeper and wider understanding will only come from meaningful communication between multi-agency stakeholders. This should be built upon agreed procedures to share the required information and a commitment to use commonly understood terminology rather than service-specific terminology or jargon. In simple terms, members of UC Committees cannot assume other MDAs or responders see or communicate things in the same way, and a sustained effort is required to reach a common view and understanding of events, risks, and their implications.

Production, maintenance, and dissemination of a commonly recognised information picture (CRIP) is a key priority for each UC, ensuring that UC Committee members have the appropriate data and information necessary to make effective decisions. The production and dissemination of a CRIP to other UCs in the Chain of Command will enable their UC Committee to understand the broader context of an emergency, informing their decisions and providing the cornerstone of an effective public communications strategy.

Decision making in the context of an emergency, including decisions involving the sharing of information, does not remove the statutory obligations of agencies or individuals, but it is recognised that such decisions are made against an overriding priority to save lives and reduce harm.

JOINTLY ASSESS RISKS, DEVELOP A WORKING STRATEGY IN THE INCIDENT ACTION PLAN

Understanding risk is central to effective emergency response and recovery. The Kenya NERP and the CEOPs place a requirement on key stakeholders to work together to prepare for foreseeable emergencies, developing an accurate and shared understanding of the risks which will or may affect the geographical area for which they are responsible, and to establish and practice plans to respond to any emergencies arising.

During an emergency response, that emergency preparedness planning and training should be utilised to inform Incident Action Plans (IAP) developed for each UC. A key task for UC Committees is to build and maintain a common understanding of the full range of risks arising from an emergency and the way that those risks may be increased, reduced or controlled by decisions they might make and subsequent actions taken.

The assessment of risk within the UC will assist in the development of a common understanding of threats and hazards and the likelihood of them being realised. This information will inform decisions made by the UC Committee in respect of priorities, risk control measures and deployment of available resources.

Risk mitigation and management measures employed by individual MDAs also need to be understood by the other responding organisations in order to ensure any potential for unintended consequences are identified in advance of any activity commencing. For example, fire services understanding of hazardous materials may lead them to restrict access for unprotected staff to an area. Unless that assessment of risk is shared appropriately and the risk area effectively cordoned off, other agencies or community members unaware of the risks may enter the hazard area unprotected and be injured.

A joint assessment of the prevailing risks also limits the likelihood of any MDA following a course of action in which the other agencies are unable to participate. This sharing of information and establishment of a common understanding, therefore, increases the effectiveness and efficiency of the response as well as the probability of a successful resolution of the incident.

It is rare for a complete or perfect picture to exist during the early stages of any incident and therefore a working strategy and the IAP based on the best information available at the time should be drafted.

The following should be considered when developing that IAP:

- **a.** What are the aims and objectives to be achieved?
- **b.** Who is responsible for key actions police, fire, local government, St John Ambulance, Red Cross, or any other partner organisations?
- c. When will the actions occur, what are the timescales, deadlines, and milestones?
- d. Where will activities and responses occur and what are the locations?
- **e.** Why are certain actions and activities needed now (or at a specific location): what is the rationale? Is this consistent with the overall strategic aims and objectives?
- **f.** How are these tasks going to be achieved?

In order to formulate and deliver an effective integrated multi-agency IAP, the following key steps must be undertaken:

<u>IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS:</u> Hazard and risk information for pre-identified major risks, such as chemical plant, port or airport facilities, will be compiled by responsible

MDAs and incorporated into sectoral response plans. This hazard information will be supplemented by additional information from the incident scene once the first responders arrive. Information gathered from the incident scene by individual agencies must be shared with the sub-county UC, and from there, through the command chain to county and national UCs as appropriate.

<u>DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT:</u> Undertaken by Command and General Staff at the UC on a continuous basis, reflecting the tasks/objectives to be achieved, the hazards that have been identified and the likelihood of harm from those hazards.

<u>IDENTIFICATION OF THE TASKS:</u> Each MDA should identify and consider the specific tasks to be achieved according to its role and responsibilities and all of these should be recorded in the IAP.

<u>APPLY CONTROL MEASURES:</u> Each UC should consider and apply appropriate control measures to monitor actions they are responsible for in order to ensure any risks arising are as low as reasonably practicable.

INTEGRATED MULTI-AGENCY TACTICAL RESPONSE PLANS: The UC IAP must establish what should be done, and by whom, but will need to be supported by more detailed tactical delivery plans setting out how actions will be delivered. The tactical delivery plans of each MDA should be developed on a multi-agency and integrated basis, ensuring that they will deliver the agreed goals and priorities set out in the IAP.

<u>RECORDING OF DECISIONS:</u> The outcomes of the joint assessment of risk should be formally recorded by UC General Staff, together with the identified priorities and the agreed multi-agency IAP. The Chair of the UC Committee should sign copies of agreed documents to certify them as being a true reflection of the decisions made. It is acknowledged that in the very early stages of the incident this may not be possible, but it should be noted that post-incident scrutiny inevitably focuses on the earliest decision-making.

LIST OF SUB-ANNEXES IN SUPPORT OF ANNEX 3

ANNEX 3A:

GUIDANCE NOTE FOR CONDUCT OF UC COMMITTEE MEETINGS

ANNEX 3B:

UC ADMINISTRATION

ANNEX 3C:

TEMPLATE FOR A COMMON RECOGNISED INFORMATION PICTURE (CRIP) BRIEF

ANNEX 3D:

TEMPLATE FOR INCIDENT ACTION PLAN (IAP)



ANNEX 3A:

GUIDANCE NOTE FOR CONDUCT OF UNIFIED COMMAND COMMITTEE MEETINGS

A REMINDER OF KEY OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES:

KEY TASKS FOR THE UC COMMITTEE INCLUDE:

- a. Gather and then maintain an accurate operational picture:
 - · What is happening?
 - · What are the impacts?
 - · What are the risks?
 - · What might happen? and
 - What is being done about it?
- **b.** Determine the longer-term and wider impacts of the event and assess risks with significant implications;
- c. Ensure effective coordination across all agencies and sectors of disaster response;
- **d.** Produce an Incident Action Plan that establishes the framework, policy and parameters that all responders under the UC will follow and communicate to all responding MDAs and other UCs that may be established; and
- e. Monitor the context, risks, impacts and progress towards defined objectives.

The UC Committee is established to define multi-agency strategy and it is expected that the representatives from each MDA will work together constructively and collaboratively to reach a consensus before issuing consistent instructions to their agencies to work per the agreed IAP. This means that each responding MDA must act in a directed and coordinated fashion in pursuit of the objectives that they have mutually agreed.

The UC Committee and supporting secretariat structures may take some time to set up and obtain a clear picture of unfolding events. This initial period following an incident occurring may be when the best opportunities exist to take decisive action. Where UC is activated in response to a no-notice incident, their default strategic objectives are to:

- → Protect human life and, as far as possible, property and the environment;
- → Alleviate suffering;
- → Support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
- → Uphold the rule of law, the Constitution, and the democratic process.

As a first priority, the UC Committee must formulate an IAP that prioritises key objectives and clarifies the actions to be taken, and by whom. The IAP will then provide the focus for all responding organisations. As the UC Committee meets and gains a full understanding of the situation, supported by the UC support staff groups, they should then review and amend the IAP and adjust objectives and priorities, as necessary.

THE UC COMMITTEE OUTLINE AGENDA

NOTE: It is for the UC Committee Chair to determine the frequency and agenda for UC Committee meetings. The following is intended only as a suggestion of some key issues that should be covered at the initial UC Committee meeting and subsequent briefings/meetings.

FIRST UNIFIED COMMAND COMMITTEE MEETING

- a. Introduction from the Chair and outline of the general situation as it is currently known, confirmation of appointments to Secretariat Command and General Staff Positions, identification of any further organisations or individuals that should be invited to become UC Committee members for this event, declaration of any issues requiring urgent action/decision;
- **b.** Discussion and confirmation of decisions on urgent items.

ADJOURN AS NECESSARY TO ACTION URGENT ISSUES:

- **a.** All UC Committee members, including any ad-hoc members invited by the Chair, briefly introduce themselves (*This is by exception only, it is anticipated that all UC members will know each other through prior training and exercising.)*
- **b.** Chair outlines the objectives for this meeting.
- **c.** UC Operations Section Chief provides an overview of the operational situation as currently understood following the CRIP information format. The briefing should include any intelligence or information on anticipated conditions or developments over the next period. (UC Operations Section Chief will liaise with their other counterparts in the General and Command Staff to ensure they have a comprehensive understanding of the situation prior to the briefing session.)

- d. Establishment of operational objectives and priorities to be included in the Incident Action Plan (Established at the 1st meeting, then subsequently reviewed at each meeting) Where the UC Committee is activated in response to a no-notice incident, its default strategic objectives are to:
 - Protect human life and, as far as possible, property and the environment;
 - · Alleviate suffering;
 - Support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
 - · Uphold the rule of law, the Constitution, and the democratic process
- **e.** Consideration of emerging issues / urgent actions arising and identifying the responsible MDA or person.
- **f.** Chair concludes meeting and confirms the time of next briefing and the agreed priority actions for the next period
- g. Record all agreed actions in the Incident Action Plan using SMART objectives that are;
 - Specific
 - Measurable / Measurement
 - Achievable
 - Relevant
 - · Time-Oriented

SECOND AND SUBSEQUENT UNIFIED COMMAND COMMITTEE MEETING

- **a.** Introduction from the Chair including a reminder of the objectives for this meeting and declaration of any issues requiring urgent decision;
- b. Discussion and confirmation of decisions on urgent items;

ADJOURN AS NECESSARY TO ACTION URGENT ISSUES:

- **a.** UC Operations Section Chief provides an overview of the operational situation as currently understood following the CRIP information format. The briefing should include any intelligence or information on anticipated conditions or developments over the next period. (UC Operations Section Chief will liaise with their counterparts in the General and Command Staff to ensure they have a comprehensive understanding of the situation prior to the briefing session.)
- **b.** Short update/input from each agency, including a progress report on priority actions for their organisation that had been previously been set and agreed in the Incident Action Plan.
- **c.** Review and revision as necessary of operational objectives and the Incident Management Plan.
- **d.** Consideration and agreement of emerging issues/resource requirements/urgent actions arising.

- **e.** Determine any new actions required and allocate responsibility for agreed actions using SMART Objectives that are:
 - Specific
 - · Measurable / Measurement
 - · Achievable
 - Relevant
 - · Time-Oriented
- **f.** Chair concludes meeting and confirms the time of next briefing and the agreed priority actions for the next period.

ANNEX 3B:

UC COMMITTEE ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR UC COMMITTEES

- **a.** Nameplates for UC Committee Members and any additional experts invited to attend by the Chair should be prepared and in place.
- **b.** UC support staff should maintain a record of key issues discussed, and all actions that are agreed. This record should include time and dates of discussions and decisions and list all members present.
- **c.** The record log should list any decisions that were not made, in addition to those that were.
- **d.** All IAPs CRIPS, status reports, and any requests for assistance and resources should be formally recorded.



ANNEX 36:

TEMPLATE FOR A COMMON RECOGNISED INFORMATION PICTURE (CRIP) BRIEF

PREAMBLE

This should include the title of the operation or exercise, the serial number of the CRIP, the time 'as at' it was written, the authorship and so on.

THE GROUND

The CRIP brief starts with a general description of the geographical area affected and its main features, including maps and plans as appropriate. This could include population and infrastructure distribution, sites of special interest, boundaries of responsibility and appropriate mapping.

THE SITUATION

This is the expression of situational awareness. As such, it should be an analysis of the situation and not merely a chronological list of events. It is the definitive statement of what is understood about the emergency at that point in time, what its wider implications are and how it might be expected to develop. This captures the three elements of situational awareness, which are perception, comprehension and forecasting.

THE STRATEGIC AIM

This is a brief statement that expresses the singular strategic aim established by UC Committee that all agencies are working together to achieve through the agreement of an Incident Action Plan. It gives focus to the diverse tasks and activities of the separate agencies.

THE OBJECTIVES FOR THE COMBINED RESPONSE

These are the outcomes expressed in SMART terms (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound) that each agency will deliver as its contribution to achieving the agreed response aims.

THE UC COMMITTEE TASKS AND COORDINATION ISSUES

TASKS

This section may describe the actions and decisions required of the UC Committee at the next meeting.

COORDINATION

This section could usefully include the reference to other groups the UC Committee is dealing with, including Incident Command Posts established in the field, UCs established at different levels in the National Incident Management System, or international partners.

RESOURCE ISSUES

This section might include analysis of critical resource issues and decisions, such as the deployment of reinforcing or supporting assets mobilised into the area.

COMMUNICATIONS

Media and public information 'lines to take' should be identified here, including key public safety messages and details of press conferences, media coverage and public reaction.

END OF BRIEF

Including details of next meeting if known.

NOTES

Any further or additional information relating to the situation or emergency response that the UC Committee believes will be useful.

RECORDING AND UPDATING OF THE CRIP

CRIPs should be numbered sequentially and issued on a timeline decided by the UC Committee Chair. It may be convenient for CRIP updates to be aligned to the frequency of UC Committee meetings that are also directed by the UC Committee Chair, for example, every hour, every 6 hours, every day etc. as required taking into account the nature of the incident.

To assist busy UC Committee Members in quickly identifying new information or changes in the CRIP, new information is added to the text in red. Old information is retained in black or progressively deleted if it is no longer relevant.

WHEN CRIPS SHOULD BE USED

The CRIP is the key briefing document that is presented to the UC Committee members at the start, or close to the start, of each formal meeting – immediately before the UC Committee reviews their IAP and decides on further interventions that may be necessary to progress toward the desired 'end state'.

ANNEX 3D: TEMPLATE FOR INCIDENT ACTION PLAN (IAP)

INTRODUCTION TO THE TEMPLATE

The Operations Section Chief is responsible for compiling the Incident Action Plan, assisted by other members of the Command and General staff. It is presented to and approved by, the UC Committee.

The template IAP Form below may be used to assist in the production of the IAP. The IAP form sets out important information about the actions required for responding to the incident and records and summarises the information supporting those proposals. For large and complex emergencies, the IAP form may be used to summarise key information and actions, with more detailed action plans prepared on a sectoral or geographical basis.

COMPLETING THE IAP FORM

I. INCIDENT NAME IDENTIFY THE EMERGENCY OR EVENT THAT THE IAP REFERS TO

2. LEVEL OF UNIFIED COMMAND NSC, NDRMC, CDRMC OR SCDRMC

3. SITUATION

Obtaining accurate, reliable situational awareness during the initial hours of an incident is often challenging. Situational awareness is further complicated by the urgency of collecting, analysing, and disseminating situational information. Initial situational awareness involves the gathering of information from as many sources as possible, as quickly as possible, to ensure that decision-makers have the knowledge they need to make the best possible decisions.

Provide a summary overview of the situation in this section. This will require consideration of the following

- → What is happening and what are the impacts? Describe the nature of the emergency, describe what has already happened, the communities or areas impacted, the number of casualties or potential casualties, impact on infrastructure or critical services, impact on property and the environment.
- → What are the risks and what might happen? Describe the risks posed by the emergency, both those immediately arising for communities and responders, and those that may arise if action is not taken.
- → What is being done about it? Describe the actions already taken, plans enacted, and resources deployed.

4. DIRECTION AND INCIDENT OBJECTIVES

Describe the end state desired, the aims and objectives for emergency response and recovery efforts, and any overarching values and priorities will inform and guide this. Where the CDRMC or the SCDRMC is activated in response to a no-notice incident, their default strategic objectives are to:

- → Protect human life and, as far as possible, property and the environment;
- → Alleviate suffering;
- → Support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
- → Uphold the rule of law, the Constitution, and the democratic process.

As the emergency progresses, further and more detailed incident objectives may be set.

5. ACTION PLAN

This section should list the key response and recovery actions required to achieve the directions and incident objectives set out in **Section 4** of this Annex. It should set out the lead and supporting the MDA, NGO, or private sector responder responsible for each action. This should include a description of what must be done, and by whom. The action plan should include a list of resources (*personnel*, *teams*, *equipment*, *supplies*, *facilities*) that are required to deliver the action, identify any resource gaps that must be filled, and describe the desired end state?

Each action should be ranked by priority. In determining incident priorities, the axiom that if everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority clearly applies. Descriptions of the actions required should be as specific as possible; must be attainable; and if possible, given a working timeframe. A process for establishing SMART objectives for each action will be very useful to guide in this process. SMART denotes;

I. SPECIFIC

Ensuring response and recovery actions are specific means they should clearly set out 'what is to be done – how will it be done – who will do it, and how it be known once it is done?' Objectives in the action plan also need to clearly describe the expected results (end product) of the action to be undertaken. The description should be written in such a way that anyone reading the action will most likely interpret it the same way.

2. MEASURABLE

Measurable elements of the action plan answer the question 'how will one know the action is completed and has met expectations?' using assessable terms (quantity, quality, frequency, costs, deadlines, etc.). For example, evacuation of community *X* should be achieved in no more than 1 hour.

3. ACHIEVABLE

Achievable answers the questions can the teams on the ground realistically be expected to deliver the action with the resources they have available, in the time/measurement that has been set? This involves an evaluation of the responder's resources and capabilities, in addition to an understanding of the tasks being set. It also answers the question 'Can it be done given the time frame, opportunity and resources?' These items should be included in the SMART objective if they will be a factor in the achievement.

4. RELEVANT

Relevant answers to the questions, 'should it be done? 'why do it?' and 'what will be the impact?' Given the need to prioritise response and recovery actions, and maximise the use of all resources, it is important to ensure that the objective is aligned with the overall Incident Action Plan objectives set out in **Section 4** of this Annex as above.

5. TIME-ORIENTED

Time-oriented answers the question, 'when will it be done?' It refers to the fact that an action has endpoints and checkpoints built into it.

IAP TEMPLATE FORM

1. Incident Name	2. Level if Unified Command	Date From:	Date To:
		Time From:	Time To:
3. Situation			
4. Direction			
4. Direction			
5. Actions			
Priority 1. (Insert Description of the Action required)			
Responsible Agency			
responsible regency			
Actions to be taken			
Resources Required / To be deployed			

End State to be achieved
Priority 2. (Insert Description of the Action required)
Responsible Agency
Actions to be taken
Resources Required / To be deployed
End State to be achieved
Priority 3. (Insert Description of the Action required)
Responsible Agency
Actions to be taken
Resources Required / To be deployed
End State to be achieved

Additional sections to be added for each separate action in the IAP

RELEVANT LAWS, POLICIES AND PROTOCOLS

The below laws, ordinances and policies have or are to be considered in the preparation of the NERP:

- a. Environment Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) of 1999
- b. The Kenya Red Cross Society Act Cap 256
- c. The Water Act Cap 372
- d. Grass Fire Act Cap 327
- e. Petroleum Act Cap 116
- f. The Explosives Act Cap 115
- g. St. John Ambulance of Kenya Act Cap 259
- h. Factories and Other Places of Work Act Cap 514
- i. The Local Authorities Act Cap 265
- i. The Chiefs Act related to disaster Cap 128
- k. The Public Health Act Cap 242
- I. The Pharmacy and Poisons Act Cap 244
- m. The Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board Cap 253
- n. The Kenya Ports Authority Act Cap 391
- o. The Civil Aviation Authority Act Cap 394
- p. The Transport and Licensing Board Act Cap 404
- q. The Animal Disease Act Cap 364
- r. The Kenya Railways Act Cap 354
- s. The Forest Act Cap 385
- t. The Agricultural Act Cap 318
- u. The Kenya Bureau of Standards Act
- v. The National Cereals Board and Produce Act Cap 388
- w. The Exchequer and Audit (Strategic Grain Reserve)
- x. Trust Fund) Regulations 2000

- y. The Police Act Cap 84
- z. The Armed Forces Act Cap 199
- aa. The Administration Police Act Cap 85
- ab. The KWS Act Cap 376
- ac. Insurance Act Cap 1984
- ad. The NYS Act Cap 208

Other related conventions and multilateral agreements include the following:

- ae. Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)
- af. The Nairobi and Abidjan Conventions for the Protection of the Oceans
- ag. The Vienna Convention (1985) and the Montreal Protocol (1987)
- **ah.** United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
- ai. Kyoto Protocol
- aj. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)
- ak. Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent (PIC)
- **al.** Basel Convention on Trans-boundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal
- am. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (RAMSAR)
- an. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)
- ao. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
- ap. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
- aq. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols



THE HUMANITARIAN CODE OF CONDUCT

THE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT IN DISASTER RESPONSE.


The Code of Conduct shall guard our standards of behaviour in disaster response. It seeks to maintain the high standard of efficiency, effectiveness and impact to which disaster relief agencies aspire. It shall be a voluntary code enforced by the will of organisations accepting to maintain standards laid down in the Code.

THE 10-POINT CODES OF CONDUCT ENTAILS:

- 1. The humanitarian imperative comes first in order to alleviate human suffering.
- **2.** Aid is given regardless of race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated based on needs alone.
- 3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
- 4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
- 5. We shall respect culture and custom.
- 6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacity.
- 7. We shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
- **8.** Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerability to disaster as well as meeting the basic needs.
- **9.** We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
- **10.** In our information, publicity, and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified human beings and not hopeless objects.


ANNEX 6: ANN

DISASTER MAP




SOURCE: The consultant, 2020

GEOLOGICAL MAP




SOURCE: National Disaster Response Plan 2009 and updated by the consultant, 2020

FOOD SECURITY MAP




SOURCE: Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) 2020

FLOOD MAP



SOURCE: The consultant, 2020

DROUGHT MAP




SOURCE: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2019

LANDSLIDE MAP



SOURCE: https://reliefweb.int/ and source of picture, Citizen TV 2020

EARTHQUAKE SEVERITY MAP



SOURCE: The consultant, 2020

GUIDANCE ON PRODUCTION OF SUPPORTING SOPS AND SECTORAL RESPONSE PLANS

The NERP and supporting CEOPs establish structures and systems of work for effective emergency preparedness and response in Kenya. However, the NERP and the CEOPs must be supported by a wide range of more detailed supporting documents as set out in **Section 1.5** of the NERP. Whilst some supporting documents may be produced in support of Unified Commands at national, county and sub-county level, most will be developed by individual ministries, departments, agencies, NGOs and private sector stakeholders. Whilst responsibility for the production of these supporting documents rests with the MDA concerned, generic guidance to assist in their production is set out below.

PRODUCTION OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)

There is no single international standard or process for the production of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). However, whilst there is no single generic international structure to follow, international best practice does highlight several common features that should be incorporated.

WHAT IS AN SOP? HOW IS IT DIFFERENT TO A SECTORAL RESPONSE PLAN?

National, and County emergency response plans generally identify the operating principles to be adopted in response to any emergency, including the structures for incident command and coordination and key actions to be taken by each MDA. In short, they set out what should be done in response to an emergency. Sectoral Response Plans set out a further layer of detail, describing how individual sectoral responder agencies and organisations will undertake the various response functions they are responsible for.

Whilst national, county, and sectoral plans describe what should be done, a further level of detail is required to guide individuals on how specific tasks should be delivered. SOPs provide this further layer of detail, setting out written guidelines or instructions that describe how specific and individual tasks set out in other plans should be achieved. SOPs typically include both operational and technical components, for example, providing guidance on how to operate specialist equipment or establish an emergency shelter. SOPs may be single or multi-agency in nature, so can be used to establish detailed instructions for several responder agencies working together to achieve the same objective, or produced to direct the delivery of an individual function within a single agency.

SOP CONTENTS AND STRUCTURE

SOPs play a key role in managing the risks faced by responders as part of their activities. An SOP should therefore record key safety actions and information such as:

- → A description of the specific activities covered by the SOP;
- → The potential hazards presented by those activities;
- → Both the likelihood of an injury/damage occurring as a result of the activity and its severity (i.e. the risk);
- → What control measures can be implemented to reduce the risk to a level that can be considered as low as is reasonably practicable, for example, provision of personal protective equipment;

Risk Control measures identified within SOPs will inevitably involve the description of some or all the following:

- → Roles and responsibilities of key organisations and/or individuals in the delivery of the tasks or action described in the SOP;
- → A description of the systems and tactics to be deployed to undertake the tasks or action described in the SOP:

- → A description and technical specification of any operational equipment or personal protective equipment necessary to undertake the tasks or action described in the SOP;
- → A description of any qualifications required to enable individuals to undertake the task, and details of any preparedness activities required, including initial training and ongoing refresher training and exercising.
- → In addition to ensuring response effectiveness and the safety of responders undertaking specific tasks, a further key advantage delivered through the adoption of SOPs is that they provide the clarity and certainty necessary to enable various individuals, and MDAs to come together in a coordinated way to respond to an emergency or resolve any disruptive event as they provide a common understanding of how operational response will be delivered.

SOPS SHOULD BE DRAFTED TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING;

- → Set out performance expectations. SOPs describe and document what is expected of organisations or individual personnel in the performance of their official duties. As such, they provide a benchmark for personnel, an objective mechanism for evaluating operational performance, and a tool for promoting a positive organisational culture.
- → Enable standardisation of activities. SOPs identify planned and agreed-upon roles and actions. This information helps standardise activities and promote coordination and communications among personnel. SOPs also simplify decision-making requirements under potentially stressful conditions.
- → Provide a design criterion for training and reference documents. Written SOPs can provide a framework for training programmes, briefings, drills, and exercises. These activities, in turn, improve the understanding of work requirements and help identify potential problems. A comprehensive SOP manual also serves as a self-study and reference document for personnel.
- → Supports systems analysis and feedback. The process of researching and developing SOPs provides opportunities for managers to compare current work practices with state-of-the-art procedures. Feedback from outside groups, technical experts, and staff can help to identify potential problems and innovative solutions.
- → Aid external communications. SOPs clarify the MDAs operational philosophy and recommended practices. As such, they may prove useful in communicating organisational intentions and requirements to outside groups or enhancing the public's understanding of the government and non-government services.
- → Enhance communication within agencies, SOPs ensure everyone is clear about their role, what is expected of them, and how they should respond give a specific incident type. SOPs can therefore form a vital role in the design of training, assessment and competence systems.

- → Enhance communication between agencies required to work together to resolve an emergency, ensuring each is clear about their role, responsibilities and the contribution they can make.
- → Enhance communication between different levels of government and different government departments, ensuring that there is clarity about the capabilities available and certainty that resources will be utilised to maximum effect.

SOP REVIEW SYSTEMS

Production of SOPs must is not a 'static' process. Once initial drafts are adopted as substantive SOPs, they should be considered a 'live' document, systematically reviewed and updated in the light of experience or changes to the national/local risk assessment process.

PRODUCTION OF SUPPORTING EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS

Multi-agency and multi-sectoral Emergency Response Plans may be developed at national, county or Sectoral levels for the most significant hazards and risks that have been identified by each MDA. For example, a national pandemic plan, or food security plan. Response Plans will also be required to direct the response actions of single agencies, for example, the fire service will be responsible for the formulation of plans on how to respond to and safely tackle a building fire.

Whilst the NERP and the CEOPs establish the comprehensive framework and structures for emergency response in Kenya, no single emergency response plan can include sufficient detail to enable every potential emergency to be resolved. The production of sectoral, geographical and hazard-specific plans, consistent with the NERP and the CEOPs, addresses this gap.

The process for the development of supporting emergency response plans must take into consideration potential natural, technological, and man-made threats, and involve consultation with a range of organisations and personnel in the planning process. In this way, the planning process itself builds capacity and understanding across response partners and can facilitate effective problem solving and communication, thereby creating a flexible and adaptable environment for managing critical incidents. Consequently, the engagement, planning and consultation process itself can provide almost as much benefit and value as the final plan that is produced.


The production of supporting emergency response plans helps to ensure that an organisation is prepared for the various emergencies that it may need to respond to, and in the event of an emergency, can take effective steps to reduce losses to people and property and prevent damage to the environment. An effective emergency response

plan also serves as internal documentation, recording necessary response actions as well as forming the basis for the design of periodic drills and exercises.

During an emergency, the emergency response plan provides a starting point for response and a foundation for the Incident Action Plan (IAP) developed by each Unified Command.

As illustrated in **Figure A7.1** below, prepared an emergency response plan involves four important components: planning, reviewing, training, and testing. These are the cornerstones of any emergency response plan and it should be noted that it is a circular rather than linear process.

FIGURE A7.1: Emergency Planning Process



SOURCE: The consultant, 2020

Site-specific emergency response plans, such as those prepared for high-risk premises such as chemical storage or production facilities, ports, airports or hospitals, will include additional information that will be required by responders, such as maps, building plans, checklists and contact details for key staff. The process of designing those site-specific plans should include liaison with local responders to clarity who is responsible for key actions, and to agree on arrangements for site-level ICS, including the nomination of an Incident Command Post on-site as necessary.



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